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CLASSIFICATION OF HOMOSEXUALS UNDER
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
FORWARD-LOOKING DISPARATE
IMPACT TEST
By A. NICOLE KWAPISZ1
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans came early to accept the inevitable
presence of outsiders .... Although every citizen
could claim a basic set of legal rights, some of
these citizens would almost certainly remain out-
siders .... Each generation passed to the next an
open question of who really belongs to American
society. Equality and belonging are inseparably
linked: to define the scope of the ideal of equality
in America is to define the boundaries of the na-
tional community. 2... The most heartrending dep-
rivation of all is the inequality of status that
excludes people from full membership in the com-
munity, degrading them by labeling them as out-
siders, [thus,] denying them their very selves.3
The promise of equality was explicitly written into the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 Yet,
1 Student at St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida.
2 KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND
THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1989) [hereinafter KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA].
3 Id. at 4.
4 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, CONCISE HORNBOOK: PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.1
(2007) [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONCISE HORNBOOK] (stating that
the equal protection clause requires that "individuals who are similar to each
1
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homosexuals, a historically stigmatized minority,5 have been re-
peatedly denied the opportunity of full participation in Ameri-
can society.6 Furthermore, governmental entities at all levels
continue to pass and enforce anti-gay laws,7 which remain
mostly unchallenged because they are subject to minimal judi-
cial scrutiny. Nonetheless, recent history has shown signs of a
shift in political and social attitudes towards gays and lesbians. 8
other must be treated similarly"); KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra
note 2, at 2.
5 See MIRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 791-92, 1225 (11th ed.
2003). "Minority" means "the smaller in number of two groups constituting a
whole" or "a part of population differing from others in some characteristic
and often subject to different treatment." Id. at 791-92. To "stigmatize"
means "to describe or identify in opprobrious terms." Id. at 1225.
6 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 217
(Foundation Press 2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, SEXUALITY]. Author
discusses history of sexual orientation-based discrimination in the United
States, which remains in effect in many states. Id.
Local, state, and federal governments in the United States per-
vasively discriminated against people based on their sexual or
gender orientation during the twentieth century. For most of
the century, lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered
people were the objects of special criminal laws against cross-
dressing and homosexual solicitation, as well as generic sodomy
laws; ...were excluded from services in the United States
armed forces;.., were barred from federal or state government
employment; ... suffered under the stigma of laws or policies
barring schools from depicting sexual or gender minorities pos-
itively or requiring them to denigrate such minorities;.., could
not obtain state recognition of their intimate relationships;...
and could not adopt children or even retain custody of their
own biological children;... [and] were excluded from entering
the United States or becoming American citizens.
Id.; see, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW, CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 205-38 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW]
(analyzing antigay laws).
7 See ESKRIDGE, SEXUALITY, supra note 6; ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note
6.
8 See, e.g., Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321,
124 Stat. 3515 (2010); President Barack Obama, Statement by the President
on the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (Dec. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/18/statement-president-
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Particularly, the latest exciting developments legalizing same-
sex marriage in New York, although on state level, clearly tip
the scale in favor of equal rights for homosexuals. 9 However,
the state laws favorable to homosexuals remain vulnerable to
federal preemption.1o In search of a meaningful solution, some
argue that elevating the level of judicial scrutiny would eventu-
dont-ask-dont-tell-repeal-act-2010 ("It is time to recognize that sacrifice,
valor and integrity are no more defined by sexual orientation than they are
by race or gender, religion, or creed; it is time to allow gay and lesbian Amer-
icans to serve their country openly."); Eric E. Holder, Statement of the At-
torney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb.
23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/li-ag-
222.html [hereinafter Holder, Statement]. In a letter directed to members of
Congress, Attorney General, Eric E. Holder, announced on February 23,
2011, that President Obama declared the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
(DOMA), which prohibited recognition of same-sex marriages, unconstitu-
tional. Id. Consequently, President Obama instructed the Department of
Justice to stop defending suits challenging the statute. Id.
After careful consideration, including a review of my recom-
mendation, the President has concluded that given a number of
factors, including documented history of discrimination [immu-
tability, lack of political power, and the trait's lack of bearing
on legitimate policy objections] classification based on sexual
orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scru-
tiny. The President also concluded that Section 3 of DOMA
[defining marriage for federal purposes as only between a man
and a woman], as applied to legally married same-sex couples,
fails to meet the standard and is therefore unconstitutional.
Id.
9 See Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex
Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approved-by-
new-york-senate.html (stating that in recent years several states enacted ban
on same-sex marriage, prompted by a culture war and politicians "who
deployed the issue as a tool for energizing their [ideological] base"); Dan
Wiessner, New York Governor Signs Law Approving Gay Marriage,
UNIONLEADER.COM, June 25, 2011, http://www.unionleader.com/article/2011
0625/NEWS/110629906&source=RSS ("New York will become the sixth and
most populous U.S. state to allow gay marriage.").
10 See Tara Siegel Bernard, What Gay Marriage News Means for You, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/what-the-
gay-marriage-news-means-for-you/?pagemode=print (stating that Section 3
of DOMA will remain in effect unless it is repealed by Congress or struck
Volume 5, Number 1 Fall 2011
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ally prompt government entities to cease enacting policies moti-
vated by anti-gay animus.11 Paradoxically, many of the
prejudicial statutes do not explicitly target homosexuals, but in-
stead carry a disparate adverse impact against sexual minori-
ties.12 Thus, under the current disparate impact analysis,
down by a judicial decision; and as long as DOMA remains a valid law, the
Executive Branch will continue its enforcement).
11 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747,
761 (2011). Author points out that "Congress has more power to legislate
with respect to classifications drawing heightened scrutiny than with respect
to classifications drawing only rational basis review. The inability of new
groups to have discrimination against them receive formal heightened scru-
tiny has profoundly negative effects on their equal protection claims." Id.
12 See, e.g., Matthew D. Besser, The Use of Sex-stereotyping claims by LGBT
employees in Ohio, 24 OHIo LAWYER MAGAZINE 20 (Jan. 2010). "The issue
of sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace is not merely aca-
demic." Id. at 21. Although, federal law does not address sexual orientation
discrimination, sexual minorities do suffer negative consequences. Id. Ac-
cording to a 2007 UCLA Law School compendium of studies "16 to 68 per-
cent of LGBT [lesbian gay bisexual transgender] employees have
experienced workplace discrimination." Id. at 22. In addition, "studies have
also shown that gay men earn 10 to 32 percent less on average than their
similarly qualified heterosexual counterparts." Id.; Brendan Cushing-Daniels
& Tsz-Ying Yeung, Wage Penalties and Sexual Orientation: An Update Using
the General Social Survey, 27 CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY 164, 175
(2009), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Wage+penalties+and+sex-
ual+orientation%3a+an+update+using+the+general-a0201481803.html. Dis-
crimination against a particular group of workers may take many forms,
including partiality in hiring and treatment of the preferred group member
vis-A-vis the marginalized group. Id. In addition, "[e]vidence of discrimina-
tion in the form of lower wages is widespread if not universal," and there
appears to be a "large penalty against gay men." Id. The disparity in wages
may be, in part, due to homophobia, which reduces homosexuals' productiv-
ity. Id. Moreover, "sexual orientation stigma can cause homosexual workers
stress and anxiety, which are likely to have a negative effect on their working
ability." Id.; David S. Cohen, Keeping Men "Men" and Women Down: Sex
Segregation, Anti-Essentialism, and Masculinity, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
509, 514, 529. The author discusses "mandatory sex segregation," in the con-
text of prison and jail populations, required by law based on the principle of
"assumed heterosexuality," because "men must be kept from women because
men are heterosexual and will seek out women either consensually, or non-
consensually." Id. at 514. However, because "homophobia and sexism go
hand in hand," it can lead to "violence against men who do not exhibit out-
Volume 5, Number aFall 2011
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applicable to facially neutral, prejudicial laws,' most such acts
will remain unchallenged. 14 The inadequacy of the disparate im-
pact analysis rests on a misconception that discrimination is, in
general, a consciously controlled human behavior.15 Con-
versely, cognitive science provides ample evidence for the im-
plicit nature of bias.1 6 Thus, the courts must reexamine the
concept of discrimination itself in order to prevent facially neu-
tral, stigmatizing legislative acts that violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.1 7 This article will demonstrate that because the
disparate impact analysis is inherently flawed, it needs to be re-
ward heterosexuality,... [including] those who are openly gay." Id. at 529;
see also Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth, An Epidemic of
Homelessness, NATIONAL GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE 4 (2006), http://
www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/Homeles-
sYouthExecutiveSummary.pdf (discussing President Bush's executive order
permitting federal funding for faith based organizations and its negative im-
pact on services provided to the homeless LGBT youth, because "a number
of faith-based providers oppose legal and social equality for LGBT people").
13 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 228, 240 (1976) (mandating disparate
impact test for facially neutral laws, which requires proof of impact and in-
tent to discriminate); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319
(1987) (discussing detrimental effect of disparate impact test to the "cause of
equal opportunity").
14 See Lawrence, supra note 13; see, e.g., Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious
Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact Origins of 'The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection,' 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 952 (2008) [hereinafter Lawrence,
Unconscious Racism Revisited] ("Note that Davis' uncertainty about the
cause of racially subordinating impact leads to the default position of no sus-
picion of racism.").
15 See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Sci-
entific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 945-46 (2006); see, e.,g., Jerry
Kang & Krisin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the
Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 478 (2010) (disputing the idea that we live in a
color-blind society).
16 See Greenwald & Hamilton Krieger, supra note 15, at 952 (discussing
quantitative methods of measuring implicit bias); Kang & Lane, supra note
15, at 520 (discussing "the modern authority of empirical evidence ... from
scientific experiments, with all their mathematical precisions, objective
measurements").
17 See infra Part IV.
Volume 5, Number I Fall 2011
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designed to acknowledge and utilize the vast scientific data on
implicit bias.
Part II discusses the present ambiguity of classification for
homosexuals under Romer v. Evans, which upheld discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation subject to rational review, but
opened the door to future equal protection challenges. 18 How-
ever, like other constitutionally protected minorities,19 homo-
sexuals have a long history of being invidiously discriminated
against and should be granted either suspect or quasi-suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause. 20 Part III con-
siders the examples of other protected classes, 21 and argues that
even if the Supreme Court classifies homosexuals as a constitu-
tionally protected minority under the disparate impact analysis
of Washington v. Davis,22 the class will remain vulnerable to
challenges of facially neutral, yet prejudicial laws. 23 Inciden-
tally, in Title VII,24 Congress explicitly recognized showing of
disparate impact as sufficient for a plaintiff to establish employ-
18 See infra Part II.A.
19 See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW 4-7
(1998) (arguing that homosexuals, like women and African-Americans, de-
serve suspect classification, because the respective laws against these groups
enforce unconstitutional and unjust dehumanizing stereotypes, depriving
each group of its basic human rights); infra Part II.B.
20 See infra Part II.B.
21 See RICHARDS, supra note 19; infra Part III.A.
22 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
23 See infra Part III.A.
24 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (adding
§ 703(k)(1) to Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)). "An unlawful employ-
ment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter
only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particu-
lar employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate
that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity." Id. See also ESKRIDGE, SEXUALITY,
supra note 6, at 804.
Volume 5, Number I Fall 2-01
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ment discrimination claims on the basis of race or sex.25 Fur-
thermore, the empirical studies of anti-gay implicit bias
strengthen the argument that requiring proof of discriminatory
legislative intent in facially neutral laws is futile and inadequate
to eradicate prevalent tacit discrimination.26 Thus, Part IV pro-
poses a revised, forward-looking disparate impact test, which
will abandon the intent requirement, and instead focus the
court's inquiry on quantitative evidence documenting the dispa-
rate impact of the law in question on stigmatized sexual
minorities.2 7
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: CLASSIFICATION
FOR HOMOSEXUALS
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, no person shall be denied "equal protection of the
laws" by any state.28 The law guarantees equality of legal and
social status to all citizens and rests on a principle of "mutual
respect and self-esteem." 29 As such, the Equal Protection
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 24 for the other impermissible
basis.
26 See infra Part III.B.
27 See infra Part IV.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 668 (3d ed. 2006). The Equal Pro-
tection provision was rarely used since the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment after the Civil War in 1868, until Brown v. Board of Education
[347 U.S. 483] in 1954. Id. Brown "ushered the modern era of equal protec-
tion jurisprudence." Id. Furthermore, "there is no provision in the U.S.
Constitution that says the federal government cannot deny equal protections
of the laws. However, in Bolling v. Sharpe [347 U.S. 497 (1954)] . . . the
Court held that equal protection applies to the federal government through
the due process of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
29 See KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 7 (continuing ex-
tended discussion on "equal citizenship," history of discrimination in Ameri-
can society, and the role of judicial review in promoting equality); Kenneth
L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1978) (citing J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 256
(1971)) [hereinafter Karst, Foreword] (defining the concept of "equal citizen-
Volume 5, Number 1 Fall zo11
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Clause prohibits the government from treating individuals as
members of "inferior castes" or as "nonparticipants."30 Further-
more, it protects individuals as class members from the imposi-
tion of stigma, 1 which degrades their status to less than equal.32
The equal protection analysis starts with identifying whether
the government classifies people based on certain impermissible
criteria.33 Based on a determination that the government dis-
criminates against a particular group of individuals, the court
will then apply a corresponding level of scrutiny.34 The Supreme
ship" in the substantive context of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which in principle "presumptively guarantees to each
individual [American citizen] the right to be treated by the organized society
as a respected, responsible, and participating member").
30 See Karst, Foreword, supra note 29, at 6; Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2411-12 (1993) (defining concept of the
"anticaste principle," which forbids social and legal practices from imposing
social disadvantages on a group based on a group characteristic).
31 See WEBSTER II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 663 (REV. ED. HOUGH-
TON MIFFLIN CO. 1996) [hereinafter WEBSTER II DICTIONARY]. "Stigma"
means "a mark of infamy or disgrace." Id.; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 4, § 14.2 ("If the government applies the law in a certain manner
to all persons except a single individual, the single individual may bring an
equal protection claim against the government even though the individual is
'a class of one."'); Karst, Foreword, supra note 29, at 6 (discussing an inverse
relationship between stigma and recognition of a person, because a stigma-
tized individual is perceived as "unequal in some respect.").
32 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1 (2d
ed. 1988) ("[E]quality can be denied when government classifies so as to dis-
tinguish, in its rules or programs, between persons who should be regarded as
similarly situated in terms of the relevant equal protection principles.");
Karst, Foreword, supra note 29, at 6.
33 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.2 (discussing permissible cri-
teria as related to proper governmental purpose to advance legitimate inter-
ests of society, as opposed to arbitrary reasons to burden a group of
individuals); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution,
70 IND. LJ. 1, 4 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, Homosexuality] (stating that
the Court struck down legislation on the grounds of prejudice and hostility).
34 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985) (discussing levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.2; see also
TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-1.
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Court has defined three levels of scrutiny applicable under the
Fourteenth Amendment, contingent on whether the group sub-
ject to classification falls under a protected status. 35 Ultimately,
the court will determine if the government classification was jus-
tified by a sufficient governmental purpose. 36 Under strict scru-
tiny, the most stringent standard, applicable to classifications
based on race, national origin, religion and ethnicity, the gov-
ernment will have to prove that it had a compelling reason to
discriminate and that the means it used were necessary to imple-
ment the law.37 Under intermediate scrutiny, applicable to dis-
crimination based on gender or illegitimacy, the law will be
upheld if it substantially relates to an important government
purpose. 38 A classification based upon any other trait is subject
to a rational basis review, the lowest of the three standards,
which will only require the government to show that the law
rationally relates to a legitimate government purpose.39 Since
35 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.2; Jeffery M. Shaman, Cracks
in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIo
ST. L.J. 161, 163 (1984) ("There are . . . three levels of, or tiers, of judicial
review that are invoked in their respective spheres.").
36 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.2; Shaman, supra note 35, at
161-62 (discussing development of multi-level system of scrutiny, and how
the courts apply it to determine the constitutionality of the governmental
conduct).
37 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (discussing levels of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); NOWAK & Ro-
TUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.3; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 671.
38 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (setting the level of scrutiny for
gender discrimination as intermediate); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4,
§ 14.3 (2010); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 671.
39 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.3; see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 28, at 671.
Volume 5, Number 1 rail 2011
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the rational review standard is a very low threshold,40 the court
will make every effort to uphold the law as constitutional.41
The tiers or review approach to equal protection analysis has
its critics, who argue that the rigid levels of scrutiny unduly limit
the scope of judicial inquiry.42 Instead, to review laws allegedly
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court should con-
sider a "spectrum of standards," or a sliding scale, including fac-
tors of constitutional and social importance.43 Moreover, the
critics point out that the Court has already applied this multi-
factor test in rational basis cases with more "bite" than the cus-
tomarily deferential rational basis review. 44 However, the
Court's unwillingness to redefine the standard of review applied
in these cases makes future equal protection challenges by bur-
40 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 4, § 14.3 (discussing that under ra-
tional review "the Court will ask only whether it is conceivable that the clas-
sification bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not
prohibited by the Constitution"); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at
541 (explaining that the courts generally presume the legislature passes laws
that are constitutional).
41 See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 16 (1988). Author explains that
under rational review the court will not overturn a statute unless "the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement
of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the
legislature's actions were irrational." Id.; Shaman, supra note 35, at 161. Au-
thor points out that under rational review, the court grants "extreme defer-
rence" and a "presumption of constitutionality" to the actions of the
government, that can only be "overcome by showing them to be clearly irra-
tional or unreasonable." Id.
42 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 673 (citing Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall and John Paul Stevens among those who advocated a more liberal ap-
proach to judicial scrutiny).
43 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, L. dissenting) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520
-21(1970)) (expressing dissatisfaction with the Court's rigid approach to
Equal Protection analysis, and arguing for applying a " spectrum of stan-
dards" to review discrimination claims); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at
673.
44 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 673; infra notes 56-57.
Volume 5, Number 1 rail 2ml
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dened minorities susceptible to mere rational review, and thus
not deserving of judicial protection. 45
A. Rational Basis Review Standard for
Homosexual Discrimination
In Romer v. Evans,46 the Supreme Court held that classifica-
tion based on sexual orientation does not require special consti-
tutional protection; therefore, it is subject to rational review. 47
This case involved a constitutional amendment passed by the
State of Colorado pursuant to a statewide referendum, which
repealed and prohibited all legislative, executive or judicial ac-
tions designed to prevent discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation.48 Homosexuals sued municipalities in state court to
challenge the Amendment ("Amendment 2") as unconstitu-
45 See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 12 HARV. L. REV. 747,
761-62 (discussing the rational basis with bite cases, including Romer v. Ev-
ans, and confirming that the standard applied in them is not equivalent to
formal heightened scrutiny).
46 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
47 See id. at 631; see also Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer
v. Evans and Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 464 (1997).
48 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. The Court refers to the Colorado law as
Amendment 2. Id.
Amendment 2 repeals ... ordinances to the extent they pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of homosexual, lesbian or bi-
sexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships .... The
amendment reads: "No Protected Status Based on Homosex-
ual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the State of Col-
orado, through any of its agencies, political subdivisions,
municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosex-
ual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle
any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimi-
nation. This amendment shall be self-executing."
Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 47, at 462.
Volume5, Number I tall 2011
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tional and to enjoin its enforcement. 49 The trial court issued a
preliminary injunction, which was affirmed on appeal by the
Colorado Supreme Court, holding that Amendment 2 was sub-
ject to strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment because
it infringed on homosexuals' fundamental right to participate in
the political process. 50 The U.S. Supreme Court denied the
state's petition for certiorari.51 On remand, the trial court found
the Amendment failed the strict scrutiny test and the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed.5 2 This time, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment.53
In his opinion for the majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy
concluded that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the State discriminated against an entire class of
persons, making the class "strangers to its laws. " 54 The Supreme
Court confirmed that homosexuals did not deserve protective
status as a class under the Equal Protection Clause,55 making the
49 See Jackson, supra note 47, at 461; see also Amy D. Ronner, When Courts
Let Insane Delusions Pass the Rational Basis Test: The Newest Challenge to
Florida Exclusion of Homosexuals from Adoption, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 68 (2010).
50 See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
51 See Ronner, supra note 49, at 68.
52 See id.
53 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626; see also Jackson, supra note 48, at 462.
54 Id. at 635 ("Amendment 2 classifie[d] homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else."); see Ronner,
supra note 49, at 31. Colorado cited several reasons to justify passage of
Amendment 2, but the Court was not persuaded by any of them. Id.
In Romer the State strained to justify Amendment 2. The State,
portraying the amendment as a champion of other citizens'
freedom of association, said that it gave liberty to those land-
lords and employees who contended that the amendment
helped conserve resources to fight for more worthy causes, like
discrimination of minorities. The court discredited those ratio-
nalizations, implying that they were delusional.
Id.
55 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633; see also Jackson, supra note 48, at 464 (ex-
plaining that Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority (6-3) stated: "If a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will up-
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law subject to rational review. 56 However, Amendment 2 failed
the rational review test for two reasons: first, because it imposed
a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single group; and
second, because it harbored "animus" towards an entire class of
people.57 Ultimately, the Court rejected Colorado's arguments
justifying Amendment 2 as an effort to protect other citizens'
liberties, including their freedom of association, and conserving
resources to fight discrimination against other minorities.58 Col-
orado's law simply did not rationally relate to any "identifiable
legitimate purpose or discrete objective."5 9 However, because
the Supreme Court did not commit to a heightened level of scru-
tiny, Romer's applicability, like the cases cited by the Court, re-
mains "narrow in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual
context... to ascertain some relation between the classification
and the purpose it served." 60 As such, Romer joins a small
group of cases which constitute narrow, targeted exceptions
hold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end." ).
56 See id.
57 Id. at 632 ("[s]heer breadth [of Amendment 2] is so discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects"); BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 86 (7th ed.
1999) (defining "animus" as animosity, and "class-based animus" as "a preju-
dicial disposition toward a discernible, usually constitutionally protected,
group of persons").
58 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; see also Ronner, supra note 49, at 31 (discussing
State's argument as "strained to justify Amendment 2," therefore discredited
by the Court).
59 Id. at 635.
60 Id. at 632-33; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Unde-
cided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Foreword] (con-
cluding that although "the Court's puzzling and opaque opinion is not
satisfying from the theoretical point of view," it serves another, less obvious
purpose, and is masterful in combining degree of caution and prudence with
a good understanding of the fundamental purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause).
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where laws were struck down even under the application of the
rational review standard. 61
Nonetheless, Romer needs to be acknowledged as a landmark
case which set a precedent for future equal protection chal-
lenges based on "animus" and comprehensive disabilities im-
posed on a group of people.62 One important aspect of the case
is the Court's emphasis on the fact that homosexuals are subject
to a "deeper kind of social antagonism," associated not only
with homosexual conduct but also with the homosexual iden-
tity.63 Furthermore, relating homosexuality with status, rather
than acts, links discrimination based on sexual orientation with
discrimination based on race or gender and opens the door to a
possibility of future reclassification of sexual minorities as a con-
stitutionally protected class.64
61 In addition to Romer, the Court struck down state laws in other cases
using a form of the rational review test referred to as rational review with
"bite." See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
450 (1985) (invalidating zoning ordinance requiring special permit to operate
group home for the mentally retarded based on irrational prejudice); U.S.
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (finding the amendment to
Food Stamps Act of 1964, which required household members to be related
to prevent "hippies" from participating in the program not rationally related
to the government's goal of preventing fraud); see also Ronner, supra note
49, at 30 n.157 (discussing cases that failed rational review test, and pointing
out that "some commentators argue that the Court in these cases use[d] a
stricter version of the rational basis test by giving rational basis a 'bite"');
Sunstein, Foreword: supra note 60, at 59 (coining the cases that survived ra-
tional review as the "Moreno- Cleburne-Romer Trilogy").
62 See Ronner, supra note 49, at 31; see also Sunstein, Foreword: supra note
60, at 59 (explaining that the approach taken by the Court was "minimalist"
in order to minimize burdens and dangers of making decisions in general,
particularly erroneous decisions).
63 Sunstein, Foreword: supra note 60, at 62 (The author analogized Romer
and Cleburne). "Here, as with the mentally retarded, we can find a desire to
isolate and seal off members of a despised group whose characteristics are
thought to be in some sense contaminating or corrosive." Id.
64 See id.
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B. Heightened Scrutiny For Homosexuals as Suspect or
Quasi-Suspect class
The absence of protective status for homosexuals as a class
under the current equal protection jurisprudence makes gays
and lesbians vulnerable to rational review, 65 which gives a great
degree of "judicial deference" to legislative and administrative
laws.66 Yet, the Equal Protection Clause stands for an "anti-sub-
jugation principle" and guards against laws that treat some peo-
ple as "second-class citizens." 67 Because homosexuals, like the
other constitutionally protected classes, have a long history of
invidious discrimination based on societal prejudice and stereo-
65 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (landmark case regarding status of homosexuals, where the U.S. Su-
preme Court overruled its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) and invalidated Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
See Ronner, supra note 49, at 31; supra Part II.A. See generally Kenneth L.
Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause,
55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 133 (2007).
The equality discussed in the Lawrence opinion is the same as
the equality discussed in Romer: equality of status for a social
group defined by a sexual orientation. Yet, the Court rested the
Lawrence decision not on an equal protection ground, but
rather on Fourteenth Amendment liberty, that is substantive
due process. Although the opinion in Lawrence neither identi-
fied a fundamental interest nor suggested a standard of review
that would require the state to offer important or compelling
justification for its restriction on liberty, it did insist on some
significant justification beyond the moral disproval of homosex-
uality that had sufficed in Hardwick.
Id.
66 See TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-5 (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) "When expressed as a stan-
dard for judicial review, strict scrutiny is . . . 'strict' in theory and usually
'fatal' in fact.").
67 See TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-21 ("When the legal order that both shapes
and mirrors our society treats some people as outsiders or as though they
were worth less than others, those people have been denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws.").
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types, 68 they should be granted heightened scrutiny.69 Further-
more, "judicial designation of homosexuality as a suspect
classification . . . could provide a comprehensive doctrinal
framework to address the problem of gay inequality." 70
Since heightened levels of scrutiny warrant more stringent ju-
dicial inquiry into legislative intent and the purpose of the law,7'
68 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 787; William N. Eskridge, Jr., No
Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling
Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2000) [hereinafter
Eskridge, No Promo Homo] ("For most of the twentieth century, laws or
social norms stigmatizing gay people were justified on the ground that gay
people do disgusting things or are diseased or predatory."); AMY D. RON-
NER, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW 3 (2005) (defining homophobia as "an ir-
rationally negative attitude towards homosexuals that can manifest itself in
harassment, verbal abuse, and even outright violence," and stating that
"homophobic attitudes still pervade both legislative and judicial decisions,
denying rights on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity").
69 See Ronner, supra note 49, at 31; supra Part II.A. "Heightened scrutiny"
refers to both suspect and intermediate scrutiny, because either of these ele-
vated levels of judicial review would provide more adequate protection for
sexual minorities than the current rational review standard. Part II.B of this
article shows that sexual minorities do meet the criteria under the test ap-
plied by the Court to examine applicability of strict scrutiny. Consequently,
if strict scrutiny applied to sexual minorities, sexual minorities would also
meet the less stringent criteria of intermediate scrutiny, or rational review
"with a bite," under Romer. For a discussion of classification of homosexuals
as a suspect class, see Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality As a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Constitutional Status].
70 Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1297; see also TRIBE, supra
note 32, § 16-1 ("The lack of openly acknowledged criteria for heightened
scrutiny permits arbitrary use of the type of inquiry undertaken in Cleburne,
for which courts will remain essentially unaccountable.").
71 See Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 33, at 7.
The Supreme Court has granted "heightened scrutiny" to laws
that discriminate against certain identifiable groups likely to be
at particular risk in the ordinary political process. When the
Court grants heightened scrutiny, it is highly skeptical of legis-
lation, and the burden of every doubt therefore operates on
behalf of groups challenging the relevant laws.
Id.; see also Kenneth Karst, Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1969) [hereinafter Karst, Developments in the
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the Supreme Court has defined specific criteria relevant in de-
termining whether a particular classification qualifies as sus-
pect.72 The Court considers whether: (1) the class is a "discrete
and insular minority" that lacks political power;73 (2) there is a
history of discrimination against the group;74 (3) there is a social
Law] (discussing in-depth the process of judicial review for suspect classifica-
tion and judicial review).
72 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). Justice Brennan, in
his plurality opinion, joined by Justice Douglas, White, and Marshall, stated
that "classifications based on sex, like classifications based upon race, alien-
age, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. Although the Court ultimately settled the gen-
der classification at intermediate scrutiny (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)), Frontiero provided invaluable insight into the analysis of factors con-
sidered by the Court for the elevated scrutiny status. See TRIBE, supra note
32, § 16-6; see also Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 33, at 7; cf Note,
Constitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1299 (stating that suspectness cannot
be absolutely determined in every case; however, articulable boundary of
suspectness can be created, by focusing on criteria which are universally ac-
cepted as reliable means of determining a group's need for judicial
intervention).
73 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938)
("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends [to] seriously . . . curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial review."); Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 686 ("Women still face pervasive, although more subtle, discrimina-
tion in our educational institutions, in the job market, and perhaps most con-
spicuously, in the political arena."); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST, A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 152 (1980) (discussing Justice
Stone's opinion in Carolene Products); TRIBE, supra note 32, at 16-32.
74 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 ("There can be no doubt that our Nation
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally
such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage."); see
also HART ELY, supra note 73, at 152; Karst, Developments in the Law, supra
note 74, at 1065 (discussing that continuing presence of discrimination, evi-
denced in history of subjugation of American Blacks, needs to be remedied
by heightened scrutiny to compensate for both past suffering and to correct
the imbalance of the persistent prejudice in the present).
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stigma perpetuated by a stereotype;" 75 and (4) the trait by which
the class members are defined is immutable.76 Although "none
of the factors standing alone indicates whether a particular clas-
sification should receive heightened scrutiny," all of them con-
sidered together help the Court to determine whether a group
needs elevated judicial protection. 77
75 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685. The Court pointed out that women in the
past were viewed primarily based on their roles as wives and mothers, and in
accordance with the "law of the Creator." Id.
[O]ur books became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society was in many ways,
in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-
Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and
married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their
own children.
Id.; see also WEBSTER II DICrIONARY, supra note 31, at 663 ("[s]tigma"
means "a mark of infamy or disgrace;" "[s]tereotype" means "a conventional,
formulaic, usually highly simplified opinion, conception, or belief"); HART
ELY, supra note 73, at 152 (concluding that legislation based on stereotype is
a legislation by generalization, without room for statistical deviation, which is
inevitable in legislation, but under an erroneous assumption, it denies mem-
bers of minorities equal protection); Note, Constitutional Status, supra note
69, at 1297 (discussing problem of "political powerlessness," because legisla-
tive decisions are not only affected by actual political influence, but also by
"unarticulated claims" about the legitimacy affecting the group, which are
not always obvious).
76 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. The Court explored issues of immutable
traits in the context of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
[S]ex, like race, and national origin, is an immutable character-
istic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition
of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex be-
cause of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic conception
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility.
Id. But see HART ELY, supra note 73, at 150 (disputing validity of immutabil-
ity as a factor for heightened scrutiny, because alienage, and [even] gender
are alterable, but justify heightened scrutiny, while physical disability and in-
telligence are not considered as classifying suspect traits).
77 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. The Court concluded that generally "sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute
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Although the Supreme Court has never applied this analysis
to cases of discrimination based on sexual orientation,78 there is
ample evidence that such discrimination merits heightened scru-
tiny.79 Homosexuals are politically powerless, because societal
prejudice and hostility often force them to remain anonymous
or "diffuse" their sexual orientation.80 Conversely, even when
gays and lesbians overcome the social, economic and political
pressures to conceal their sexual orientation, the "general ani-
mus" towards homosexuality may prevent public officials from
openly supporting legislation favorable to homosexuals. 81
to society." Id. "As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often
have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior
legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual mem-
bers" Id.
78 See Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 33, at 7 ("The Court has not yet
decided how discrimination against homosexuals should be treated."); Note,
Constitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1297.
79 See Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1285;
Even within a "nation of minorities," American gay people
constitute a minority group that at once elicits an extraordina-
rily high degree of fear and contempt from society at large and
receives an inordinately low degree of state protection from the
institutionalization of that antipathy. Gay lobbyists and liti-
gants have found little refuge in legislatures and courts ....
[Thus] the courts should recognize homosexuality as a suspect
classification under the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause of the
[F]ourteenth [Almendment.
Id.; see also Holder, Statement, supra note 8 (concluding that "classification
based on sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of
scrutiny"); Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 33, at 8.
80 See Sunstein, Homosexuality, supra note 33, at 8 (defining "anonymous"
as "not known to be homosexual" and "diffuse" as "not tightly organized" );
see also HART ELY, supra note 73, at 153 ("'[Plrejudice' . . . is a lens that
distorts reality. We are a nation of minorities and our system thus depends
on the ability and willingness of various groups to apprehend those overlap-
ping interests that can bind them into a majority on a given issue; prejudice
blinds us to overlapping interests that exist.").
81 See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (vacated
en banc for a different reason), 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Sun-
stein, Homosexuality, supra note 33, at 8 (discussing the problem faced by the
proponents of gay rights, who often become "accused" of being homosexuals
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Moreover, gays and lesbians have a long history of discrimina-
tion documented in a vast body of legislations, both state and
federal, prohibiting homosexuals from participating in the most
fundamental functions of a democratic society.82 And there is
an undisputed social stigma against sexual minorities, ranging
from pervasive attitudes viewing homosexuals as mentally ill,
deviant or predatory,83 to more subtle "benign" but exclusory
treatment.8 4 At last, there is the immutability factor to consider
in the analysis for heightened scrutiny, which continues to be a
themselves, which may be harmful to their reputations); Note, Constitutional
Status, supra note 69, at 1286 ("[Homosexuals] are forced to deny or disguise
their identity in order to enjoy rights and benefits routinely accorded
heterosexuals.").
82 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 6, at 5 (providing in depth historical
perspective on discrimination based on sexual orientation and an overview of
American regulation of sexual and gender variations in general); Note, Con-
stitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1305 ("Because homosexuality is a deter-
minative feature of personhood and because gay people have historically
been victims of stigmatization and discrimination, courts must subject legisla-
tion that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation to a heightened standard
of review and must closely scrutinize the state interests embodied in the
legislation.").
83 See KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 151 ("Harm from
direct, intentional stigmatizing acts are complemented by the harms inflicted
indirectly and unthinkably by officials and others who are systematically inat-
tentive to inequities that fall on members of a stigmatized group."); Eskridge,
No Promo Homo, supra note 68, at 1328 ("For most of the twentieth century,
laws or social norms stigmatizing gay people were justified on the ground
that gay people do disgusting things or are diseased or predatory.").
84 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 6, at 2. Author explains that "homo-
sexuality" is not a natural category, but a concept defined in the Western
culture. Id. Although people of the same sex engaged in intimacy for centu-
ries, "Western modern culture is distinctive in analyzing that intimacy around
the concept of sexual orientation and stigmatizing the desire for such inti-
macy as well as the acts themselves." Id.
[G]ender and sexual orientation are not natural forms but are
instead "socially construed" categories reflecting a system of
power relations; the social creation of disproved forms of gen-
der and sexuality generates social travesty, and the innovation
of law to direct social travesty generates apartheid of the closet,
where gay people are physically as well as socially isolated; and
the categories and the closet have not been productive and
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contested subject of vigorous debates on both sides of the is-
sue.85 However, over the years, science has provided more con-
sistent research supporting a proposition that homosexuality is
immutable, rather than based on preference and conduct.86
Therefore, sexual orientation classification meets the criteria for
heightened judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause.87
should be ameliorated by laws' acceptance of the idea of be-
nign sexual variation [opposed to malign].
Id.; HART ELY, supra note 73, at 162-63 ("Homosexuals for years have been
the victims of both 'first-degree prejudice' and subtler forms of exaggerated
we-they stereotyping.").
85 See ESKRIDGE, SEXUALITY, supra note 6, at 246-47. Immutability may be
relevant to suspect classification analysis because it would be unfair to penal-
ize individuals for traits they cannot change, and the oppressed group may
embrace the trait viewing it through a prism of identity. Id.; but see Susan R.
Schmeister, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495 (2008). The
author argues there is rhetorical confusion surrounding homosexuality and
choice, linking it to a "misguided jurisprudence of immutability." Id. Fur-
thermore, focus on immutability as a factor represents an unnecessary depar-
ture from the core purpose of equal protection jurisprudence, which is to
combat systemic discrimination against sexual minorities. Id.
86 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Expressive Impact of Patents, 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 573, 582-91 (2006). The author discusses current scientific research
regarding biological causes of homosexuality. Id. He acknowledges that sex-
ual orientation, in biological terms, is a complex characteristic, and that
"finding a single cause is highly unlikely." Id. at 583. However, studies of
identical twins separated at birth suggest strong genetic influence on sexual
orientation. Id. at 584. Other studies, examining brains of gay and straight
men suggested that the neuronal mechanisms and brain structure that regu-
late sexual behavior differ between gay and straight, leading some scientists
to believe there may be a "gay gene." Id. However it is uncertain whether
the brain influences the sexual orientation or vice versa. See id. The author
also discusses congenial studies, showing the more sons a woman has, the
more likely that a subsequent son will be gay. See id. Although not conclu-
sive, these studies show great and promising insight into the link between
sexuality and biology. See id.
87 See Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1308.
An equal protection approach to gay rights recognizes both
that personhood is the value to be protected and that inequality
is the evil to overcome. Despite the unwillingness of most
courts to ... extend the range of suspect classifications, height-
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Considering examples of other protected classes, race and
gender in particular, application of heightened scrutiny to dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation would undoubtedly lead
to more uniform judicial review and help eradicate facially prej-
udicial, stigmatizing legislation. 88 However, as in cases of other
protected classes, facially neutral laws that have a discriminatory
effect on sexual minorities would be subject to review under the
elusive standard of disparate impact analysis.8 9
III. DISPARATE IMPACT TEST AND SUBCONSCIOUS BIAS
Under the Equal Protection Clause, facially neutral laws that
strongly suggest discrimination because of their impact are diffi-
cult to challenge because they require proof of intent to discrim-
inate.90 The problem with reviewing claims based on prejudice
in political outcomes rather than on the structure of the political
process first surfaced in the context of racial discrimination. 91 In
ened scrutiny in cases involving discrimination against gays is
justified by an analysis of the concerns that should and do lie
behind our current concepts of suspectness.
Id.
88 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 756; see also TRIBE, supra note 32,
§ 16-20 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the doctrine that facially race-neutral gov-
ernmental action will be subject to strict scrutiny only if it is discriminatory in
impact and purpose, and otherwise will require only judicial review under the
rational basis standard).
89 See TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20; KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA,
supra note 2, at 152; Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Discriminatory Im-
pact: An Assessment After Feeney, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1379, 1404 (1979)
[hereinafter Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Discriminatory Impact] ("De-
spite the growing number of Supreme Court pronouncements on discrimina-
tory purpose, the actual process of ascertaining 'purpose' in a given case
remains one of the more elusive legal exercises.").
90 See TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20; Lawrence, supra note 13.
91 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 726. The author discusses the difficul-
ties of proving discriminatory purpose in school segregation laws that were
facially neutral. See id. In Keys v. Schl. Dist. No.1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S.
189 (1973), the Court draws distinction between de jure [legal] segregation,
which was a constitutional violation, and de facto [factual] discrimination,
which required proof of discriminatory purpose. See id. Thus, proof of racial
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Washington v. Davis ("Davis"),92 the Supreme Court announced
that to be reviewed under strict scrutiny, the law must have a
discriminatory impact and purpose.93 This "motive-based" stan-
dard has proven fatal to many Equal Protection Clause chal-
lenges, because it places a "very heavy, and often impossible
burden of persuasion" on a minority to show that the govern-
ment passed the law with a specific purpose to discriminate. 94
But the laws may have discriminatory impact on a minority and
lack a specific discriminatory intent on the part of the legisla-
ture. 95 For example, legislatures often create generally applica-
ble "one size fits all" laws, without considering specific classes of
segregation in schools is not sufficient to establish an equal protection viola-
tion, and like in other areas of equal protection law, "there must be evidence
of intentional acts to segregate schools ... to justify system-wide remedy."
Id.
92 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
93 Id. at 240; see e.g., Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(deciding that facially-neutral laws discriminating based on gender are sub-
ject to disparate impact analysis); see KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA,
supra note 2, at 152. In Feeney, the Supreme Court extended the burden of
proof to claims of sex discrimination, stating that discriminatory motive "ei-
ther is a factor that has influenced the legislature's choice or it is not." See id.
However, such a simplistic view of human motivation is inadequate when
considering individual action, and much more complex when considering a
large body of legislation. See id.
94 See Lawrence, supra note 13; KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra
note 2, at 154 ("One serious objection to a motive-centered doctrine of dis-
crimination is ... that it places the burden of justification on the wrong side
of the dispute, to the severe detriment of the constitutional protection of
equality.").
95 See KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 152.
Because an individual's behavior results from the interaction of
a multitude of motives, and because the attitudes of both offi-
cials and judges about race and sex are mostly embedded below
a level of consciousness, in any given cases the official will be
able to argue that the action was prompted by considerations in
which race and sex played no part.
Id.; see also Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
471, 551-52 (2008).
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individuals that the law will affect.96 Conversely, the legislators,
based on their prior experience, may learn to write laws that
"seem" facially neutral, but are a pretext for discrimination. 97
However, more often than not, the problem of proving a dis-
criminatory intent behind a facially neutral law lies within the
modern concept of discrimination itself.98
Although most Americans pride themselves as being egalita-
rian-minded, "social research studies on race and implicit bias
indicate that Americans today are not . . .color blind."99 The
findings regarding the subconscious nature of racism can be ap-
plied to other forms of prejudice, since discrimination towards
different minorities shares universal characteristics and pat-
terns.10 0 Moreover, the tacit nature of discrimination finds sup-
96 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 95, at 551. "The problem with relying on the
legislature to determine what types of activities should or should not consti-
tute legally adequate provocation is that legislatures tend to enact broad-
based legislation that will apply to many different cases based on an abstract
hypothetical set of facts." Id.
97 See KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 152; Eang L. Ngov,
War and Peace Between Title VII's Disparate Impact Provision and the Equal
Protection Clause: Battling for a Compelling Interest, 42 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 1,
29 (2010) (defining "overt discrimination as 'the most obvious,' vs. pretextual
discrimination, which is a subtle form of 'intentional discrimination hidden
behind a veneer of facially neutral practices."').
98 See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 14, at 952.
99 See Lee, supra note 95, at 537; cf. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra
note 2, at 151 (explaining that the twentieth century social and constitutional
attack on racial caste resulted in rhetoric of individualism, but the principles
of exclusion from community are common to other minorities that experi-
ence stigma).
100 See Lee, supra note 95, at 547. Author argues that implicit racial bias can
be applied to sexual discrimination bias because "many egalitarian-minded
heterosexual individuals sincerely believe that gays and lesbians should not
be discriminated against and self report positive attitudes towards homosexu-
ality, yet manifest implicit bias in favor of heterosexuality and against homo-
sexuality. Id. Implicit bias is a concern whether one is talking about race,
gender, sexual orientation, or age." Id.; see also Note, Discriminatory Pur-
pose and Discriminatory Impact, supra note 89, at 1386-88 (pointing out that
Davis analysis for racial discrimination in facially neutral laws was extended
to gender discrimination in Feeney).
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port in the relevant equal protection jurisprudence and proves
that the disparate impact test under Davis is futile and inade-
quate to eradicate racism as well as other forms of discrimina-
tion, including discrimination based on sexual orientation.101
Thus, the Court needs to apply a different test that would pro-
vide remedial measures for the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause.102
A. Inadequacy of Davis' Disparate Impact Test
In Davis, the Supreme Court fashioned a disparate impact
test to determine whether a facially neutral law, in fact, discrimi-
nates against a racial minority.103 The case involved a challenge
101 See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 14, at 954
("Note that Davis' uncertainty about the cause of racially subordinating im-
pact leads to the default position of no suspicion of racism.").
102 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 13. Author proposes an alternative stan-
dard to Davis, called "the cultural meaning test" that would trigger judicial
recognition of race-based behavior. See id. "[T]he chief virtue of the cultural
meaning test lies in the correct question: Have societal attitudes about race
influenced the governmental actor's decision?" Id. Contra Note, Discrimi-
natory Purpose and Discriminatory Impact, supra note 89, at 1404.
[I]f discriminatory purpose is to serve its role in maintaining a
proper balance between the court's obligation to enforce the
[E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause and their responsibility to defer
to the reasonable acts of legislators and administrators, meth-
ods must be developed to determine those instances where an
improper consideration of race or gender has infected the legis-
lative process .... Discriminatory purpose can be proved by
'direct' evidence of purpose-such as legislative history,
speeches, minutes, or testimony - by circumstantial evidence -
such as 'objective' evidence of the way in which actions were
taken, as the results of those actions, from which purpose can
be inferred, or by some combination of the two.
Id.; see Eang L. Ngov, supra note 97, at 29 (discussing Title VII [of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964] in context of disparate impact analysis, and concluding
that disparate impact "is most likely to survive strict scrutiny by serving the
compelling purpose of removing barriers to provide equal employment
opportunities").
103 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); KARST, BELONGING
TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 155; Lawrence, supra note 13; Gayle Binion,
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to a skills examination, known as Test 21, used by the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("DC Police De-
partment") to screen applicants for employment.1 0 4 Unsuccess-
ful black applicants alleged that Test 21 was unconstitutional,
based on the statistical data which revealed the failure rate of
the test was four times higher for blacks than for whites.'l 5 In
his opinion for the majority, Justice White articulated that the
discriminatory impact of the law "standing alone" was insuffi-
cient to prove racial classification.1°6 Consequently, a facially
neutral legislative act would be subject to rational review,10T un-
less "there was a proof of discriminatory purpose behind the
law."10 8 In the instant case, the Court held that Test 21 was
"Intent" and Equal Protection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup, CT. REV. 397,
404 (1983); Robert G. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and
Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL.
L. F. 961, 1002 (1977) ("[T]he significance of Davis for modern equal protec-
tion litigation lies [in] . . . what it says about laws with facially neutral
provisions.").
104 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 237; TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20; Schwemm,
supra note 103, at 970.
105 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 237; TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20; Schwemm,
supra note 103, at 970.
106 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (explaining that under the Equal Protection Clause
"disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it's not the sole touchstone of
an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution"); CHEMER-
INSKY, supra note 20, at 710; Schwemm, supra note 103, at 1050-51.
107 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 248.
A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is never-
theless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it
burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and
would raise serious questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a
whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory and li-
censing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white.
Id.; KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 155 (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision to adopt the disparate impact standard and ex-
plaining that "[t]he doctrine of discriminatory motive was a way to contain
the reach of the equal protection clause - and the role of judges - by saying
'thus far and no further'").
108 Davis, 426 U.S. at 240 (stating "the basic equal protection principle that
an invidious quality of law must be traced to a racially discriminatory pur-
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facially neutral because it applied equally to black and white ap-
plicants.10 9 Furthermore, "absent direct or inferential proof that
the test was employed with a design to produce racially dispro-
portionate results,"1o the disparate failure of black applicants,
by itself, was insufficient to support a prima facie case for racial
discrimination."' Under the rational review standard, which is
highly deferential to the government,11 2 the Court deemed "Test
21 was directly [and rationally] related to the requirements of
the police training program," because its scores sufficiently cor-
related with the actual performance of the police officers'
tasks.113 Thus, Test 21 was upheld as constitutional.114
pose"); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 710 (citing Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980)); TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20 ("Disparate impact on an ac-
knowledged suspect class, without more, required only rational review under
the rational basis standard.").
109 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 ("Respondents, all Negros, could no more suc-
cessfully claim that the test denied them equal protection than could white
applicants who also failed."); Schwemm, supra note 103, at 972.
110 Davis, 426 U.S. at 252; Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Dis-
crimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme
Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1115 (1977); Schwemm, supra note
103, at 1002-03.
111 See TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20; Freeman, supra note 110, at 1115.
112 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 250-52; Schwemm, supra note 103, at 972 ("The
test was racially neutral on its face, and the Court found its use a rational
means of upgrading the verbal skills required of police officers.").
113 Davis, 426 U.S. at 251; But see TRIBE, supra note 32, § 16-20 ("The pre-
cise weight that evidence of disproportionate impact on one race should re-
ceive was left uncertain, [n]or did the Court give many clues as to just what
short of proof it expected of the precise role of prejudiced motives in a given
governmental action.").
114 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 246 ("[T]he test is neutral on its face and rationally
may be said to serve a purpose the Government is constitutionally empow-
ered to pursue."); see also Schwemm, supra note 103, at 971-72 (explaining
that the requirement for a discriminatory purpose was warranted to limit the
potentially dangerous and far-reaching effects of the Equal Protection
Clause, which could put into question and potentially invalidate many other
laws relating to taxes, public welfare, and employment regulation).
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In his groundbreaking article published in 1987,115 Charles R.
Lawrence III, joined by other prominent legal scholars, openly
criticized the test established under Davis because the disparate
impact doctrine failed to accomplish its purpose of assessing ra-
cial animus in facially neutral laws.116 Lawrence, however, ex-
panded the discussion of the previously-cited reasons for the
failure of the disparate impact test by referring to the subcon-
scious and irrational nature of racism which, in his view,117 was
115 Lawrence, supra note 13, at 317.
116 See, e.g., Binion, supra note 103, at 405-06.
[T]he eschewal of the intent rule - in favor of the assumed al-
ternative of an impact rule - also reflects a fear of loss of privi-
lege . . . . The intent rule may, therefore, protect
socioeconomically privileged classes whose interests are repre-
sented in legislative and administrative policy from judicial in-
terference, with their resulting, often unquestioned,
advantages.
Id.; see also KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA, supra note 2, at 155 (arguing
that the discriminatory impact test fails because "[w]hen in the context of
race ... the problem of the stigma of caste cannot even be understood, let
alone resolved, by limiting inquiry to singular cases of purposeful stigmatiza-
tion action"); Schwemm, supra note 103, at 1050-51.
The primary difficulty . . . is that improper purpose is hard to
prove, and Davis ... demonstrate[s] that an equal protection
claimant will be hard pressed to establish necessary discrimina-
tory racial purpose. The effect, if not the actual purpose ...
will be to reduce the number of meritorious civil rights claims
that can be successfully brought under the equal protection
clause.
Id.
117 See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 322-23. The author offers two explana-
tions for the unconscious and irrational nature of racism. Id. at 322. First,
the Freudian theory, which "states that the human mind defends itself from
the discomfort of guilt by denying or refusing to recognize those ideas, wishes
and beliefs that conflict with what the individual has learnt is good or right."
Id. Since our history made racism an integral part of our culture, but our
society has evolved and now considers racism immoral, there is a conflict
between racist propensities and social ethics which leads the mind to exclude
racism from the consciousness. Id. at 323. Second, the theory of cognitive
psychology states that the culture, including "media and an individual's par-
ents, peers, and authority figures - transmit certain beliefs and preferences."
Id. Cognitivists refer to these beliefs as "categorizations," which are a com-
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largely influenced by our cultural belief system.118 He cautioned
that "requiring proof of conscious or intentional motivation as a
prerequisite to constitutional recognition that a decision is race-
dependent," ignored our understanding of how the human mind
works and disregarded the irrational nature of racism.11 9
In 2008, twenty years after publishing the article on pur-
poseful intent and the unconscious nature of racism, Charles R.
Lawrence III revisited his pioneering work. 120 Lawrence re-
flected on his contribution to Critical Race Theory, which pro-
vided great insight into the universal nature of discrimination. 121
Many legal scholars and cognitive scientists have since advanced
mon source of racial and other stereotypes. Id. at 337. However, because
these beliefs become an integral part of an individual's life, they are not ex-
plicit, but rather are experienced on the subconscious level. Id. at 323.
118 See Lawrence, supra note 13, at 317, 322 (1987).
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in
which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Be-
cause of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many
ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an indi-
vidual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about
nonwhites ... We do not understand the ways in which our
cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the
occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other
words, a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrim-
ination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.
Id.
119 See id. at 323 (arguing that in order to eliminate invidious racial discrimi-
nation, the legal system must find a way to "come to grips" with unconscious
racism).
120 See Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 14, at 931.
121 See id. at 948-51 (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 324 (1987)).
I wanted to prove that my argument against the discriminatory
intent requirement did not require agreement with my more
radical position that the Fourteenth Amendment embodies a
constitutional norm or value of anti-subordination, to demon-
strate that, even if we judged the Davis doctrine by the mea-
sure of the mainstream liberal theories of equal protection, the
doctrine did not serve the Fourteenth Amendment purpose....
In The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection, I spoke of the 'cul-
tural meaning' of an allegedly racially discriminatory act as the
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the research on the implicit bias theory, proving its general util-
ity and application to other types of discrimination,'122 including
discrimination based on sexual orientation.123
'best available analogue for and evidence of the collective un-
conscious that we cannot observe directly.'
Id.
122 See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 969, 979 (2006). "A central problem in today's world.., is the
possibility that many people act on the basis of implicit bias." Id. at 979. The
authors note "[i]n response, legal rules might seek to reduce the likelihood
that implicit bias will produce differential outcomes; but it would be quite
difficult to conclude that current antidiscrimination law adequately achieves
the goal." Id. However, by incorporating psychological research about the
unconscious nature of discrimination, implicit bias might be effectively con-
trolled through "a general strategy of 'debiasing through law."' Id. at 969.
See generally Lawrence, Unconscious Racism Revisited, supra note 14, at 941.
[T]he considerable and important body of research and litera-
ture.., emerged since the advent of my article. Cognitive psy-
chologists have employed carefully constructed research and
sound scientific methodology to substantiate my article's asser-
tion that we are all influenced by racial bias, much of which we
are unaware. Legal scholars, including Linda Krieger, Jerry
Kang, Devon Carbado, and others have drawn on this social
science and made the work accessible to lawyers and civil rights
activists who have, in turn, used it well to do important political
work of educating the courts and the public about the nature
role of the unconscious in discrimination.
Id.
123 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 95, at 551-52. Author argues that implicit racial
bias can be applied to sexual discrimination bias, because "many egalitarian-
minded heterosexual individuals sincerely believe that gay and lesbians
should not be discriminated against and self report positive attitudes towards
homosexuality, yet manifest implicit bias in favor of heterosexuality and
against homosexuality. Implicit bias is a concern whether one is talking about
race, gender, sexual orientation, or age." Id.; Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1569 (2004) [hereinafter Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race] (discussing implicit bias in the context of cognitive stereo-
types and affective prejudice towards homosexuals, based on the wildly pop-
ular show Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, where the five characters "gay it
up" for the entertainment value); Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 478 (dis-
cussing compiled empirical evidence on perceptual, cognitive, and behavioral
aspects of implicit bias, including the effects on homosexual populations).
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B. Title VII: Employment Discrimination Loophole
Discussion of disparate impact in cases involving facially neu-
tral laws would be incomplete without referencing Title VII,124
where Congress departed from requiring proof of intent in em-
ployment discrimination claims.125 Specifically, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 recognized a valid claim for relief as long as a plain-
tiff could show the employer's discriminatory practices caused
disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin.126 In addition, the statute required the employer
to demonstrate that the "challenged job practice ... [was] job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity."127 The modified standard strongly supports a conclu-
sion that Congress codified disparate impact because proving
that an employer acted with a discriminatory intent caused con-
fusion and inconsistencies in judicial interpretation.
The difficulty in establishing liability based on an employer's
intent lays in the presumption that the employers are cognizant
of their discriminatory actions.128 Prior to the 1991 Title VII
amendment, the courts applied disparate treatment theory,
which required showing that an employer acted with a conscious
discriminatory intent.129 For example, in Price Waterhouse v.
124 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2002e et seq.
The Act was codified as amended in 1972 and 1991. Title VII provides federal
protection against job discrimination in the private sector, as well as in state
and federal employment cases.
125 In-depth analysis of statutory structure in antidiscrimination laws is be-
yond the scope of this article. However, the codification of disparate impact
in Title VII claims is relevant to the article's premise because it shows that
proving intent is inadequate to prove implicit bias which is often a prevalent
and underlying factor in discrimination claims.
126 See supra note 24.
127 Supra note 24.
128 See Eang L. Ngov, supra note 97, at 41.
129 See Ann C. McGinely, iViva La Evolucion!" Recognizing Unconscious
Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & Pun. POL'Y. 415, 417 (1999) [hereinaf-
ter Ann C. McGinely, iViva La Evolucion!]. The author concludes that "al-
though the scholars have struggled with the meaning of discriminatory intent,
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Hopkins3° Justice Brennan stated that to prove discrimination,
the employer must have had a conscious discriminatory motive
at the time of making the adverse employment decision.' 3' The
case involved a female employee (Hopkins) who was denied
partnership in an accounting firm because the male partners
viewed her as too masculine, and thus non-conforming to the
employer's expected standards of a female manager. 132 The
Court held that such gender stereotyping was illegal.133
To find the employer culpable, the Court circumvented the
conscious awareness requirement by reasoning that "Title VII
meant to condemn even those decisions based on a mixture of
legitimate and illegitimate considerations."'134 Thus, the Court
"unwittingly" expanded the definition of intent by considering
both consciously and unconsciously held stereotypes affecting
employment decisions. 35 Congress codified the "mixed mo-
tives" provision into the Civil Rights Act of 1991, applicable in
cases of sex discrimination. However, because the Act did not
explicitly prohibit discrimination against homosexuals, the em-
the courts have settled on a simplistic definition." Id. According to the
courts, the employer intentionally discriminated only if and when he or she
was aware of the discriminatory purpose at the time of undertaking the ad-
verse employment decision. Id. See also Eang L. Ngov, supra note 97, at
41-42.
130 490 U.S. 228 (1988).
131 Id. at 250.
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employ-
ment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we re-
ceived a truthful response, one of those reasons would be that
the applicant or employee was a woman.
Id. See also note 129.
132 See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 234-35; infra note 133.
133 See Zachary Kramer, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gen-
der-Conforming and Gender-NonConforming Homosexuals Under Title VII,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 467 (2004). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination against individuals in an employment context,
"because of their sex." Id.
134 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
135 Ann C. McGinely, .tViva La Evolucion!, supra note 129, at 475.
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ployment discrimination claims brought under gender stereo-
type theory remain vulnerable to judicial interpretation.136
Thus, the disparate impact analysis under Davis remains the de-
fault position in cases where courts adhere to a narrow, literal
interpretation of the statutory amendment.
136 See Ann C. McGinely, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minori-
ties, and Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MIcH. J. L. REFORM 713, 715
(2009) [hereinafter Ann C. McGinely, Erasing Boundaries]. "The problem of
adequately protecting sexual minorities under Title VII lies in the courts' bi-
nary view of sex and gender, a view that identifies men and women as polar
opposites and that sees gender as naturally flowing from biological sex. Id.
See Recent Cases, Employment Law - Title VII-Sex Discrimination-Ninth
Circuit Extends Title VII Protection to Employee Alleging Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation-Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F3d
1061(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 344 (U.S.
Dec. 23, 2002) (No. 02-970), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1889-91 (2002) [here-
inafter Recent Cases]. "In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. [305 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2002)], the Ninth Circuit took up the case of a plaintiff whose Title
VII claim alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation chal-
lenged existing interpretations of the words 'because of... sex." Id. at 1889.
In that case, Medina Rene, an openly gay man, who worked as a butler at the
MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas, over a two-year period of his employment,
was repeatedly sexually harassed by his coworkers. See id. at 1889-90. Nev-
ertheless, the District held that "Title VII prohibition of 'sex' discrimination
applies only [to] discrimination on the basis of gender and is not extended to
include discrimination based on sexual preference." Id. at 1890. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed, reasoning that although Rene was harassed because of sex-
ual orientation, he could not prove that the discrimination was "because of
sex." Id. The dissent, on the other hand, cited Onacle v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc. [523 U.S. 75 (1998)], the case where the Supreme Court
"first established that same-sex harassment could be actionable under Title
VII." Id. at 1891. Ultimately, sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded, the plurality concluding that the "physical attacks to which Rene
was subjected, which targeted body parts clearly linked to his sexuality, were
'because of... sex."' Id.
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C. Effect of Implicit Bias Studies on Nature of
Discrimination Claims
Over the past two decades, extensive research has confirmed
the effect of implicit bias, 37 which has a substantial bearing on
discrimination law. 138 The theory of implicit bias contradicts the
common legal assumption that "human actors ... [are] guided
solely by their explicit beliefs and their conscious intentions to
act."1 39 On the contrary, the science of implicit cognition proves
that often actors do not have "conscious, intentional control
over the processes of social perception, impression formation,
and judgment that motivate their actions."'140 Most of the evi-
dence for the validity of implicit bias comes from the recent de-
velopment of the Implicit Association Test ("IAT"), 141 which
137 See Greenwald & Hamilton Krieger, supra note 15, at 949-51. Authors
first define implicit attitudes and implicit stereotypes, because both of these
terms are especially relevant to bias and discrimination. See id. at 948. "Im-
plicit attitudes" are implied "tendenc[ies] to like or dislike, or to act favora-
bly, or unfavorably toward someone or something. Id. "Implicit social
stereotypes" are implied "association[s] between a social group or category
and a trait." Id. at 949. Authors also define the term "bias," which some-
times is referred to as "response bias, [which] denotes a displacement of peo-
ple's responses along a continuum of possible judgments." Id. at 950.
Finally, "implicit biases" are discriminatory biases based on implicit attitudes
or implicit stereotypes. Id. at 951.
138 See id. at 956 ("The very existence of implicit bias poses a challenge to
legal theory and practice, because discrimination doctrine is premised on the
assumption that, barring insanity, or mental incompetence, human actors are
guided by their avowed (explicit) beliefs, attitudes, or intentions."); see Jolls
& Sunstein, supra note 122, at 969.
139 Greenwald & Hamilton Krieger, supra note 15, at 946.
140 Id. at 946; see also Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 468.
141 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 473. The authors explain that since
the IAT was introduced [on the Internet] in 1998, "hundreds of peer-re-
viewed scientific publications have produced largely consistent results." Id.
Clear evidence of the persuasiveness of implicit bias comes
from Project Implicit, a research website operated by Harvard
University, Washington University, and the University of Vir-
ginia. At Project Implicit, visitors can try IATs that examine
implicit attitudes and stereotypes on topics ranging across race,
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measures a wide variety of the group-valence and group-associa-
tions that cause attitudes and stereotypes among various disad-
vantaged minorities, including homosexuals. 142  The test
documents the existence of implicit bias reflected by the differ-
ence in time it takes the subject to process information corre-
sponding to well-established associations, such as stereotypes,
and their opposites. 143 The premise of the IAT rests on an obser-
vation that producing the same response "when confronted with
opposite associations is understandably more difficult than at-
gender, age, politics, religion, and even consumer brands. With
over seven million completed tests, Project Implicit comprises
the largest available repository of implicit social cognition data.
Id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 979 (2006); Project Implicit
website, http://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/posttestinfo.
html (last visited on March 12, 2011) ("The IAT was originally developed as a
device for exploring the unconscious roots of thinking and feeling.").
142 See Greenwald & Hamilton Krieger, supra note 15, at 956.
Implicit attitudes are of greatest interest when implicit and ex-
plicit attitudes toward the same object differ. These discrepan-
cies are referred to as disassociations between implicit and
explicit attitudes. Disassociations are commonly observed in at-
titudes toward stigmatized groups, including groups defined by
race, age, ethnicity, disability, and sexual orientation. Re-
searchers have used the ... IAT . . to reveal such attitudinal
disassociations.
Id.; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 979 ("[L]mplicit bias as measured by
the IAT has proven to be extremely widespread. Most people tend to prefer
white to African-American, young to old, and heterosexual to gay."); Kang &
Lane, supra note 15, at 473. The authors explain that IAT is a reaction-time
psychological test, which assesses implicit bias by measuring the time it takes
for the subject to respond to well-established mental associations, such as
social prejudice, and mentally challenging tasks, which take longer to com-
plete. Id. at 471. "The time difference, which is recalibrated into what is
known as the IAT D score, is interpreted as reflecting an implicit attitude."
Id. at 473; see also Nilananjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic
Antigay Prejudice to Behavior: The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs
About Gender and Behavioral Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
268, 270 (2006); Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 123, at 1513 (ex-
plaining that "disassociations are most vivid when "the group averages for
conscious and unconscious measures [are] placed side-by-side using a com-
mon metric,' which reveals 'wide divergences' between the means").
143 See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 95, at 537.
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tempting to map the response with given correlating [familiar]
associations. "144
Development of IAT by the scientists practicing in an emerg-
ing field of implicit social cognition ("ISC")145 is significant to
the legal analysis of disparate impact 146 because it provides
replicable evidence from numerous laboratories supporting the
theory of implicit bias.147 Furthermore, the statistical metadata
144 Id. at 539 (citing Anthony G. Greenwald et al, Measuring Individual Dif-
ferences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998)).
145 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 473 ("At the nexus of social psychol-
ogy, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience has emerged a new
body of science called 'implicit social cognition' (ISC)."); Reshma M.
Saujani, The Implicit Association Test: A Measure of Unconscious Racism in
Legislative Decision-Making, 8 MicH4. J. RACE & L. 395, 396 (2002) (citing
Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decision-makers
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 757 (1995)) ("Implicit so-
cial cognition uncovers 'inaccessible effects of current stimulus or prior expe-
rience variations of judgments and decisions."'). See generally Kristin A.
Lane, et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. LAW. Sci.
427-51 (2007) (discussing implicit bias and pointing out that it destabilizes
conventional understanding of disparate impact, and it should be considered
in the analysis as an aggravating factor).
146 See Saujani, supra note 145, at 396. The author recognizes the inade-
quacy of the purposeful discrimination rule under Washington v. Davis and
argues the Court "must adapt its vision of anti-discrimination." Id.
Imagine that we could measure unconscious discrimination. If
so, then we could broaden the concept of purposeful discrimi-
nation to include the measurement of a legislator's reliance on
unconscious racial stereotypes. Such device may already exist:
The Implicit Association Test (IAT), a computer-based test de-
veloped by Yale and University of Washington psycholo-
gists .... Currently, facially race-neutral statutes are practically
impervious to constitutional challenges by aggrieved plaintiffs,
because discriminatory intent often cannot be "located" by the
Court. This barrier has continued to shield legislators from ju-
dicial scrutiny. The IAT could "smoke out" illegitimate pur-
poses by demonstrating that the classification does not in fact
serve its stated purpose.
Id.; see also Lane, et al., supra note 145, at 439.
147 See Greenwald & Hamilton Krieger, supra note 15, at 954; Kang & Lane,
supra note 15, at 473; Lane et al., supra note 145, at 439.
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analysis of IAT results, collected over the years, has proven IAT
to be a reliable instrument that accurately assesses implicit prej-
udicial attitudes. 148 Since the inception of IAT,149 ISC scientists
used the test to produce statistical data confirming the pervasive
nature of various types of discrimination, including the anti-gay
animus.150 Metadata of the test results assessing various types of
implicit biases have shown that "most people tend to prefer
white to African-American, young to old, and heterosexual to
148 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 477-81. Authors explain that the
scientists carefully examined reliability, [which means the instrument gener-
ates sufficiently reproducible measures over time], and after a decade of re-
search, the evidence demonstrated the IAT is reliable. See id.
As for reliability, across twenty studies, the average (and me-
dian) correlation between a person's IAT score at two different
times was 0.50, which is a respectable psychometric mea-
sure. . . . [T]his level of accuracy is perfectly adequate for the
IAT's efficacy as a research tool because ... [it] can aggregate
across people to discern general patterns between mental con-
structs and behavior.
Id. Authors further explain that no psychological measure is perfectly pure,
because even a simple self-assessment, like a person's self-esteem scale, can
be affected by various variables, such as person's literacy and current mood.
See id. at 481. Thus, "IAT is no different than other psychological measures,
and the evidence suggests that none of the potential confounds can account
for IAT effects in the hundreds of studies that have used the measure." Id.
149 See Kang & Lane; supra note 15, at 473 (stating that IAT was first intro-
duced in 1998 as a Web-based test); Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit
Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a Demonstration Website, 6 GROUP Dy-
NAMICS, THEORY, RES., & PRAC. 101, 102 (2002) (discussing simplified ver-
sion of the 1AT test available on the Web since September of 2008, which
provided great accessibility and constituted a prototype for future Web-based
psychological experiments); see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 15, at
955.
150 See Kang & Lane; supra note 15, at 473 ("With over seven million com-
pleted tests, Project Implicit comprises the largest available repository of im-
plicit social cognition data."); Nosek et al., supra note 148, at 106 ("personal
standards and practicing non-prejudiced responses can influence the magni-
tude of implicit biases... [and] have shown a relationship between rigidity in
thinking, right wing ideology, and conscious and unconscious attitudes to-
ward a variety of social groups (i.e .... gay).").
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gay."'151 In addition to assessing automatic responses, which re-
present negative implicit attitudes towards the disfavored
groups,1 52 IAT data also reflect prevalent implicit stereotypes.153
For example, studies report consistent implicit negative attitudes
of straight men towards gay men when they are presented with
151 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 971 (pointing out that "[s]trikingly,
members of traditionally disadvantaged groups tend to show the same set of
preferences" as the rest of the tested population); see also Kang & Lane,
supra note 15, at 473-74. The statistical information in the metadata was
compiled based on the largest available repository of implicit social cognition
data (with over seven million tests completed). See id. The author used re-
sults from seventeen IATs available at Project Implicit. See id. Findings
showed that most participants "demonstrated implicit attitudes in favor of
one social group over another, away from the neutral position of no bias,"
including sexuality attitude preference for straight people over gay people.
Id.
152 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 476. The studies confirm that the
implicit biases are "hierarchy driven," because those belonging to the "good"
groups, including young, European, American straight people, demonstrate
strong 'ingroup favoritism.' Id. Conversely, group members culturally as-
signed to the "bad" category, representing lower social status, "marked by
weight, age, sexual orientation, [and] socioeconomic class," demonstrated
weaker preference for their own group. See id.; see also William A. Jellison
et al., Implicit and Explicit Measures of Sexual Orientation Attitudes: In group
Preferences and Related Behaviors and Beliefs Among Gay and Straight Men,
30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 629, 629 (2004) ("Implicit mea-
sures of attitudes assess automatic evaluations associated with attitude ob-
jects that perceivers may not necessarily be aware of, may not realize their
influence on overt behavior, or may not be able to control.").
153 See Jellison et al., supra note 152, at 640.
[T]he implicit measures provide another tool that is less suscep-
tible [than explicit measures] to self-presentational concerns
and introspective blindspots. Future research should continue
to explore ... group prejudices and examine the motivations
that sustain them. By continuing to explore the relationship be-
tween sexual orientation attitudes and the functions they serve,
we can better understand both processes and consequences in-
volved in the acquisition and maintenance of one's sexual ori-
entation identity.
Id.; Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 476; see also Dasgupta & Rivera, supra
note 142, at 270.
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photographic images of two men engaged in an embrace. 154
Scientists attribute strong negative implicit response towards ho-
mosexuality to traditional gender roles and sexual identity.155
Specifically, because of the pervasive stereotype that gay men
possess feminine characteristics, "gay men may be especially
aversive to straight men who [strongly] adhere . . .to cultural
standards of masculinity. '" 156 Thus, the sexual prejudice of het-
erosexual men towards homosexuals, as reflected in the IAT
data, represents straight men's endorsement of their own "mas-
culine gender role for men" stereotype. 157 Furthermore, the
IAT test findings of implicit bias correlate with actual "real life"
behaviors, reflected in altered perception and awkward body
language expressed towards the negatively-perceived subjects. 158
Thus, the more negative the implicit attitude or stereotype, the
more profound the behavioral response exhibited in uncomfort-
154 See Jellison et al., supra note 152, at 632; Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and
Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. OF SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 19 (2007) [hereinafter Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and
Correlates].
155 See Jellison et al., supra note 152, at 632. See generally Nosek et al., Per-
vasiveness and Correlates, supra note 154, at 19 (reporting that "[b]oth im-
plicitly and explicitly, participants showed a preference for straight people
relative to gay people, and 68% showed the effect implicitly while 15%
showed an implicit pro-gay effect," and there were stronger implicit effects
among political conservatives).
156 See Jellison et al., supra note 152, at 631. See generally Nosek et al., Per-
vasiveness and Correlates, supra note 154, at 19 (compiling IAT statistical
metadata and discussing statistical patterns and correlations of explicit and
implicit measures among several different demographic variables).
157 See Jellison et al., supra note 152, at 631; Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at
474-77.
158 Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 482-83; see Saujani, supra note 145, at
408-09; see also Dasgupta & Rivera, supra note 142, at 277 (explaining that
although spontaneous behavior towards stigmatized others may be driven by
automatically activated prejudice, studies also suggest that the relationship
between automatic attitudes and social behavior is malleable and that such
behavior "can be shaped by downstream conscious processes such as egalita-
rian motivation and behavioral control").
Volume 5, Number 1 rail 2-011
39
Kwapisz: Classification of Homosexuals Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 110
able body language.159 Although these behavioral manifesta-
tions may initially seem insignificant, they often carry social,
ethical and legal implications because the parties involved in
such nonverbal behavior are not even aware that they engage in
discrimination.160
The examples of gender stereotyping stemming from behavior
viewed as inconsistent with preconceived ideas of gender iden-
tity are often present in the context of employment discrimina-
tion.161 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,162 one partner
recommended that Ann Hopkins, a female employee seeking
promotion, should take "a course in a charm school." 163 An-
other male partner advised her that in order to improve her
chances for partnership, Hopkins should walk, talk and dress
more femininely, as well as "wear make-up, have her hair styled
159 See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 972. Authors point out that
those "who demonstrate implicit bias also manifest this bias in various forms
of actual behavior." Id. In particular, IAT test scores correlate with parties'
ratings of degree of general friendliness to members of another race. Id. For
example, scores show "greater speaking time, more smiling, and more extem-
poraneous social comments" in interactions with whites as compared to Afri-
can Americans." Id.; Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 483.
160 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 483-84.
[U]nfriendliness seeps out through nonverbal cues: the more
negative the implicit attitude, the more awkward the body lan-
guage. Body language matters because if one person acts awk-
wardly to another, the other person will reciprocate, thus
generating a vicious circle. This interaction will then sour the
interview without either party recognizing the implicit causal
forces.
Id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 972 (discussing the effect of
nonverbal communications in the employment context, and concluding that
"[i]f people are treated differently,. . . because of their race or another par-
ticular trait, then the principle of antidiscrimination has been violated, even if
the source of the differential treatment is implicit rather than conscious
bias").
161 See Kramer, supra note 133, at 467. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 prohibits discrimination against individuals in an employment context,
"because of their sex." Id.
162 490 U.S. 228 (1988).
163 Id. at 235.
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and wear jewelry."164 Price Waterhouse argued that it did not
endorse gender stereotyping and that some of the derogatory
comments were made "by persons outside the decision-making
chain," but the Court concluded that negative stereotyping com-
ments could influence the partners' decision in denying Hop-
kins' promotion.165 Ultimately, Hopkins prevailed on her Title
VII discrimination claim not because the Court found her to be
"nice" (and there was evidence to the contrary),166 but because
the partners, consciously or not, reacted negatively to her per-
sonality based on the fact that she was a woman. 167
Soon after, homosexuals began citing Hopkins to seek relief
for gender employment discrimination.168 However, the lack of
uniformity in cases involving homosexual harassment reflects
the courts' disagreement on the applicability of the "analytic
framework for heterosexual harassment to other contexts."' 169
In fact, the courts adopted "a binary view of sex and gender,"
which draws sharp, yet artificial, distinctions between discrimi-
nation based on sexual stereotyping and sexual orientation or
164 Id.
165 Id. at 257.
166 See id. at 234. Record indicates that although Hopkins was very compe-
tent and hard-working, on several occasions her "aggressiveness apparently
spilled over into abrasiveness." Id. And the staff members seemed "to have
borne the brunt of Hopkins' brusqueness." Id.
167 Id. at 257-58 ("It is not our job to review the evidence and decide that
the negative reactions to Hopkins were based on reality; our perception of
Hopkins is irrelevant.").
168 See Kramer, supra note 133, at 467. Author explains that Title VII prohi-
bition on discrimination "because of sex" does not explicitly protect from
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. Thus, lack of federal protec-
tion for claims based on sexual orientation prompted homosexuals to "alter-
native avenues of relief under Title VII. Id.
169 Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex." Homosexual and Bisexual
Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REV. 55, 65 (1995) (explaining that
same-sex harassment includes harassment of one's own gender, which may
constitute discrimination based on sex, "whether motivated by homosexual
desire or non-sexual animus").
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gender identity.170 Such an understanding of gender "may be
socially construed and artificially rigid rather than a natural re-
sult of biology," resulting in failure to provide adequate protec-
tion, even if the law explicitly protected employees from
discrimination based on their sexual orientation and gender
identity. 171
However, the problem of a narrow, semantic judicial interpre-
tation in Title VII cases involving homosexuals is exceedingly
more complex because the discrimination often stems from the
harasser's unconscious or hidden perceptions that "homosexual-
ity is . . . the ultimate violation of gender norms." 172 Thus, in
cases involving discrimination based on obvious non-conformity
to stereotypes, an effeminate gay man and a masculine lesbian
will stand a chance to prevail on their respective "because of
sex" discrimination claims.173 However, under the current ana-
lytical framework, the courts will likely dismiss a claim brought
170 McGinely, Erasing Boundaries, supra note 136, at 715; see also Kramer,
supra note 133, at 491.
Gays and lesbians do not fit within the binary gender construct
because they personify an opposite relationship structure:
homosexuals are attracted to the "wrong" sex, and, therefore,
the "wrong" gender.... [Thus] "homosexuality is censured be-
cause it violates the prescriptions of gender role expectations."
The heterosexist society both expects and requires men and
women to engage in only opposite sex sexual relationships.
Id.
171 Id. Author explains that the lack of adequate protection of sexual minori-
ties from employment discrimination prompted lobby to amend Title VII or
to pass new act, referred to as Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009,
to protect sexual minorities from discrimination based on sexual orientation
or gender identity. Id.
172 Recent Cases, supra note 136, at 1895 (explaining that discrimination
based on sexual orientation is in large part caused by the harasser's "refusal
to accept the behaviors of those who do not behave as members of their sex
are expected to behave"); see also Kramer, supra note 133, at 491 ("The exis-
tence of a same-sex relationship is, therefore, repugnant to heterosexist soci-
etal expectations").
173 See McGinely, Erasing Boundaries, supra note 136, at 735.
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by a homosexual comporting to societal gender expectations. 174
Consequently, in the absence of overt gender non-conformity, a
masculine gay man and a feminine lesbian will lack legal re-
course because the courts do not understand that such discrimi-
nation is often motivated by deeply-rooted, unconscious
prejudice.175
Since cognitive science provides the best available evidence
for explaining human behavior, the courts and legislature should
utilize its findings regarding implicit bias in formulating and in-
terpreting legal principles.176 Consequently, "as the new scien-
tific consensus emerges, the law should respond" 177 and
implement revisions to the legal concept of intent.178 A great
example of merging the law and cognitive science is "behavioral
174 See id.
175 Id. ("[I]n harassment cases, courts have found it difficult to distinguish
between harassment that is motivated by sexual orientation (which is not for-
bidden by Title VII) and harassment motivated by an individual's failure to
conform to gender norms (which is forbidden).").
176 See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1139 (2009) [hereinafter Kang, Pushback from the Left]; Linda Hamil-
ton Krieger & Susan Friske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 997-98 (2006).
177 See Saujani, supra note 145, at 396.
Studies using the LAT show that a test-taker can automatically
activate associations with ingrained stereotypes, which can af-
fect subsequent social and legal judgments. This finding contra-
dicts current equal protection jurisprudence, which assumes
that decision-makers can accurately point to why they are
about to make or have made a particular policy choice.
Id.
178 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 468. The authors argue that "the law
accounts for the most accurate model of human thought, decision-making,
and action provided by the sciences." Id. "Theories and data from the mind
sciences are sharpening . . . [this] model." Id. Therefore, "the law should
change to reflect that more accurate model, or it should provide reasons why
it cannot or will not do so." Id.; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship
at Ground Level: The Consequences of Non-State Action, 54 DUKE L.J. 1591,
1600 (2004) [hereinafter Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level].
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realism,' 179 which acknowledges scientific findings regarding
human decision-making and behavior and calls for amending
the existing laws or creating new laws to adequately reflect the
evolving understanding of the concepts. 180 Furthermore, behav-
ioral realism proves to be particularly useful when incorporated
into antidiscrimination laws because it offers a more compre-
hensive and accurate understanding regarding the nature of
prejudice.181 In particular, under current jurisprudence, "dis-
criminatory motivation is equated with conscious intentional-
179 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 1000-01. The authors explained
the concept of "behavioral realism," which means that "as judges develop
and elaborate substantive legal theories, they should guard against basing
their analysis on inaccurate conceptions of relevant, real world phenomena."
Id.
In the context of antidiscrimination law, behavioral realism
stands for the proposition that judicial models - of what dis-
crimination is, what causes it to occur, how it can be prevented,
and how its presence or absence can best be discerned in partic-
ular cases - should be periodically revisited and adjusted so as
to remain continuous with progress in psychological science.
Id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 972; Kang, Pushback from the
Left, supra note 176, at 1139-40.
180 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 972. The authors explain that
"work in behavioral law and economics has argued in favor of incorporating
psychological insight about people's actual behavior across a range of do-
mains." Id. Furthermore, behavioral approaches to law promote "debias-
ing" of actors through various legal strategies in order to curtail
discrimination. Id.; see also Kang, Pushback from the Left, supra note 176, at
1139-40.
181 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 1062.
We do not yet know whether social psychology will eventually
provide a simple, elegant, predictive model of human behav-
ior .... Empirical social psychology ... produces vivid, repli-
cable demonstrations of how human beings tend to behave in
particular contexts. Such demonstrations are important to law
because they often sharply contradict widely accepted psycho-
logical intuitions that judges mistakenly think provide a simple,
elegant, productive model of human behavior.
Id.
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ity."'18 2 Such legal interpretation of bias is outdated and
contrary to a well-established body of scientific empirical stud-
ies.183 Consequently, to adequately review whether facially-neu-
tral laws are discriminatory, courts should apply the framework
of the implicit social cognitive model, based on automatic and
unconscious categorization of people into social groups. 184
IV. SOLUTION: FORWARD-LOOKING DISPARATE
IMPACT TEST
The ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause is to over-
come discrimination.185 Therefore, an adequate test to recog-
nize prejudice in facially neutral laws should strive to
accomplish this goal.186 As demonstrated in Part III, discrimina-
tion is often the product of an actor's unconscious attitudes and
182 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 1062; Karst, Equal Citizenship at
Ground Level, supra note 178, at 1599-1600.
183 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 999. Author discusses negative
effects of disconnect, jurisprudential models of intergroup bias and "real
world phenomena," which lead to "normative ambiguity, adjudicative ineffi-
ciency and inaccuracy, and perhaps even an exacerbation of the very inter-
group tensions antidiscrimination laws were enacted to diffuse." Id.
184 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 1062; Kang, Pushback from the
Left, supra note 176, at 1144.
185 See Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level, supra note 178, at
1599-1600; Karst, Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 60, 66 (2004) [hereinafter Karst, Affirmative Action].
186 See, e.g., Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level, supra note 178, at
1599-1600. Author discusses Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
"forbids employers, both governmental and nongovernmental, to discrimi-
nate on grounds of race or sex in hiring." Id. at 1599. Although the violation
of the law grants the party challenging the law review under strict scrutiny in
cases involving exclusion of disparate numbers of minorities, such protection
is not available to cases involving race- or sex-neutral laws. See id. at 1599.
In those cases, "the courts continue to require a showing of purposeful dis-
crimination based on the employee's race (or sex... ) before relief can be
granted." Id. at 1600; Karst, Affirmative Action, supra note 185, at 66-70
(arguing that the ultimate goal of affirmative action is to promote diversity,
in an effort to bring "racial and ethnic equality in America").
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stereotypes. 187 Hence, placing an additional burden of proof on
plaintiffs to show that the law not only had a disparate impact
but also that the legislature had discriminatory intent (purpose),
"ignores the central feature of the psychology of discrimina-
tion."188 Thus, based on the scientific (sociological and psycho-
logical) theoretical framework, validated through extensive
empirical inquiry, 189 "plaintiffs will rarely be able to prove" a
disparate discriminatory impact. 190
187 See Katie R. Eyer, Have We Arrived Yet? LGBT Rights and the Limits of
Formal Equality, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL &
TRANSGENDER ISSUES 160, 160-61 (2010). Author discusses emergence of a
problem, previously identified by civil rights theorists, which will affect
LGBT even if the "discrimination becomes formally unlawful," because
"much of what previously would have been expressed as overt bias simply
becomes covert." Id.
The standards for proving discrimination that have been
crafted by conservative federal judges are poorly situated to de-
tect and address covert, unconscious, and structural biases.
And, even if the legal standards were more adequate, the legal
decision makers themselves - from the predominantly con-
servative judges to the jurors - are ... skeptical of the existence
of discrimination .... [Thus] absent an actual admission of dis-
criminatory animus, it is difficult to envision what more one
could do to persuade such jurors.
Id.; supra, Part III.
188 Karst, Equal Citizenship at Ground Level, supra note 178, at 1600 (stating
that in absence of discriminatory purpose, the actor-employer would deny
the suggestion that he or she "wanted to inflict harm because of an em-
ployee's race [or sex]."); see Karst, Affirmative Action, supra note 185, at 66;
Lawrence, supra note 13, at 322 ("[A] large part of the behavior that pro-
duces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation.").
189 See supra Part III.A-B.
190 Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1137-38
(1996). Author points out that "the equal protection cases discussing dis-
criminatory purpose never advert to [the] large body of empirical literature
on the sociology and psychology of bias," because "the judicial concept does
not reflect prevailing understating, in which racial or gender bias operates."
Id. at 1138. Furthermore, when [in Davis] the court adopted the disparate
impact test, it "refused to adopt an alternate 'disparate impact' standard,"
applied in employment discrimination cases, under Title VII [of the Civil
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Furthermore, the intent prong of the test, borrowed from con-
cepts in tort and criminal law,191 should be eliminated because it
is concerned with culpability centered on the concept of fault,
which does not fulfill the promise of equal citizenship under the
Equal Protection Clause.1 92 The "motive-centered" test focuses
the judicial inquiry on government's past behavior to determine
whether the government acted in "good faith," or was "guilty"
of discrimination. 193 Thus, the test implies moral condemnation
of the culpable government entity.194 However, looking for a
Rights Act of 1964], which requires application of a less stringent standard.
Id.
Title VII inquiry involves a more probing judicial review of,
and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of adminis-
tration and executives than is appropriate under the Constitu-
tion where special racial impact without discriminatory purpose
is claimed. Indeed, in Davis, the Court openly worried that re-
linquishing the purpose requirement would leave too many
forms of regulation vulnerable to equal protection challenge.
Id.
191 See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved
with Good Intentions? Stuck on the State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law,
42 WAKE FORREST L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2007) (suggesting that we should
look past "'good intentions' to revisit our notions of culpability and fault"
and to focus the disparate impact analysis solely on effects).
192 See Karst, Affirmative Action, supra note 185, at 73-74. The author dis-
cusses the correlation between race and poverty. See id. "One key objective,
in seeking to vindicate the constitutional principle of equal citizenship, will
be a material world in which individuals have a significant degree of choices
as to the paths . . . that they, and their children, will follow." id. Further-
more, "[t]he Supreme Court has turned its attention away from these condi-
tions, and nothing in recent years indicates any early change in this
conception of the judicial role." Id.; Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection
and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 520 (2003) (re-
ferring to the disparate impact test as an "evidentiary dragnet for deliberate
discrimination," because the disparate impact is difficult to prove").
193 Seicshnaydre, supra note 191, at 1141-42, 1144.
194 See Kenneth L. Karst, The Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1163, 1165 (1978). Author discusses inadequacy of the motive-centered
doctrine in racial discrimination cases, which distracts from focusing "on the
community's real ills," and adversely impacts the relationship between often
interdependent litigants outside of the context of litigation. Id.
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wrongdoer shifts the attention from the purpose of abrogating
the discrimination in the future to punishing past blame-worthy
behavior. 195 This retrospective moral judgment of the govern-
ment action is a judicial concept that fails to promote the nor-
mative principles of equality for oppressed minorities.196 In
195 See, e.g., Seicshnaydre, supra note 191, at 1141-42, 1144. Author dis-
cusses intent-based and effects-based methods of proof in disparate impact in
employment and housing discrimination claims. Id. at 1141. The two con-
cepts are often confused by litigants, who blend or enmesh disparate impact
(effect) and disparate intent. Id. at 1142. Furthermore, over the years, the
focus on intent in disparate impact theory has "proven limited ... effective-
ness, perpetuated uncertainty, and flouted" a principle that is simply too dif-
ficult to follow Id. at 1144. The author poses a question whether the cause of
suffering and exclusion is necessary to disparate impact analysis, because
"'what goes on' in the minds of those who were merely thoughtless, rather
than malevolent, or biased, matters little when class based exclusion occurs."
Id.
Several post-Katrina exclusionary zoning disputes.., illustrate
a conception of disparate impact liability in which state of mind
does not matter, [because] . ..our conceptual resources are
"exhausted" with respect to attempts to create accountability
for suffering that is not intended ..... [Thus] a pure effects
theory must be embraced - one that relies not on state of mind,
but on whether the conduct has the "consequences of perpetu-
ating segregation" and exclusion.
Id. at 1144-45. See, generally, SUSAN NEIMAN, EVIL IN MODERN THOUGHT:
AN ALTERNATIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 280-81 (2002) (discussing philo-
sophical concept of intentionality, based on human knowledge and aware-
ness, which is not relevant to the actual determination of the magnitude of
the resulting events and suffering).
196 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 192, at 585, 587. Author points out that
equal protection is not static. Id. at 585. Thus, the "rise of individualist and
colorblind values in the generation since Davis" requires evaluation of the
tension between equal protection and disparate impact in antidiscrimination
employment statutes. Id. "The very radicalism of holding disparate impact
doctrine unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection suggests that only a
very uncompromising court would issue such a decision." Id.
[A]ntidiscrimination law should not cohere only with itself. It
should also fit the social problems that it is aimed to cure. As
long as those problems are still in large part about self-perpetu-
ating [racial] hierarchies, it would be a mistake to purge con-
cern with [racial] hierarchy from the law of discrimination.
Id. at 587.
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order to curtail the pervasive discrimination against a particular
stigmatized minority, such as homosexuals, which often is not
apparent on the face of the law in question, the courts must de-
vise a test that looks forward and has a broader purpose. 97 The
objective of the test should be to not only strike down the defec-
tive law but, more importantly to prevent such discrimination in
the future. 19s
The proposed forward-looking test would consist of two
prongs. The impact prong of the test would remain mostly the
same as under the current disparate impact analysis.199 Thus,
197 See, e.g., Karst, Foreword, supra note 29, at 40 (discussing the role of the
judiciary in promoting equal citizenship under the Equal Protection Clause).
"The principle of equal protection is not so much a limiting principle as an
informing principle." Id. Because the principle is open ended, equal protec-
tion does not stop with race, "but recognizes broader substantive values in
the equal protection clause." Id.
198 See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essen-
tiality Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2313-14
(2005). Author observes that disparate impact is more favorable for plain-
tiffs, and discriminatory purpose is more favorable for defendants. Id. Fur-
thermore, "[ihe distinction between disparate impact and discriminatory
intent raises so many issues because it marks the boundary between consen-
sus and controversy over the concept of equality in civil rights law." Id.
Thus, on the practical level of administering the law, disparate impact analy-
sis allocates the burden of proof between plaintiffs and defendants. Id. But
on the "abstract level of defining the ultimate aims of the law, it structures
debates over equality." Id. at 2314. But see, e.g,. Primus, supra note 192, at
498. Author points out that progressive scholars concentrate on attacking the
holding in Davis, because the test does not adequately "address continuing
problems of inequality. Id.
[E]qual protection has moved steadily away from the orienta-
tion that the progressive critics endorse. It has become more
individualistic, more formal, and less concerned with history
and social structure. In addition to further trenching the con-
servative holding of Davis, these developments have put equal
protection in tension with Davis' acquiescence to statutory dis-
parate impact standards in laws such as Title VII [employment
discrimination laws].
Id.
199 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Michael Selmi,
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 728
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the plaintiff would have to show that the legislative act did, in
fact, result in impermissible classification of the minority.2°° As
in Davis,201 the court would begin its inquiry with answering a
question of whether the particular law, on impact, singled out a
protected minority.202 In its analysis, the court would consider
the history of discrimination experienced by the minority and
compare whether the law had such effects on any other groups
in society.203 However, in addition to using supportive evidence
available under the current version of the test,20 4 plaintiffs
(2005) (noting that many scholars often miss an important part of the dispa-
rate impact analysis in Davis, because "[c]entral to the Court's holding was a
normative judgment that the administration of the test challenged in Davis
was not properly defined as discrimination - intentional or otherwise").
200 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 229; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 710; see also
Karst, Foreword, supra note 29, at 41 (stating that judicial analysis will re-
quire constitutional balancing and assigning of weight to the government in-
terest on one side in order against the protected interest of the minority);
Selmi, supra note 199, at 728.
201 426 U.S. at 229.
202 See id.; see also Selmi, supra note 199, at 728.
203 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 235; Karst, Foreword, supra note 29, at 48 (discuss-
ing "stigma of the caste," where harm of stigma has two forms: loss of self-
respect, and legislator's inattentiveness to inequalities that fall on members
of a stigmatized group).
[T]he focus of [judicial] inquiry is not immediate harm to the
self-respect of stigma's victims, but those consequential harms,
generally of material kind, that befall people who are under-
represented in the political process. The cumulative impact of
such harms, may of course, ultimately reinforce the stigma; the
judiciary's special solicitude for those who are already disad-
vantaged is justified in part by this concern .... [T]he denial of
participation tends to produce long term losses of self-respect
as well as immediate ones.
Id.; Selmi, supra note 199, at 728-29 (explaining that the court in Davis noted
that Washington, D.C. was "without a deep history of civil rights resistance,"
and considering the city's recruitment efforts towards African American ap-
plicants, and in light of the city's black mayor, "it would have been difficult to
suggest that the city was using the test ... to exclude African Americans
from the force").
204 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242-43 (stating that showing discriminatory impact
through "seriously disproportionate" exclusion of a group "may for all the
practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality"),
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would be allowed throughout the litigation to utilize statistical
data from the existing metadata bank of IAT tests (provided
through Project Implicit) to support their claims. 20 5 Once the
court determined that plaintiffs met their initial burden of proof
by showing they suffered a discriminatory impact of the law, the
burden would shift to the government to rebut the discrimina-
tion claim.206
The major difference between the existing disparate impact
test and the new, forward-looking alternative will lie in the sec-
ond prong.207 The existing framework is highly deferential to
205 See Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 473. Author explains that since the
IAT was introduced [on the Internet] in 1998, "hundreds of peer-reviewed
scientific publications have produced largely consistent results." Id.
Clear evidence of the persuasiveness of implicit bias, comes
from Project Implicit, a research website operated by Harvard
University, Washington University, and the University of Vir-
ginia. At Project Implicit, visitors can try IATs that examine
implicit attitudes and stereotypes on topics ranging across race,
gender, age, politics, religion, and even consumer brands. With
over seven million completed tests, Project Implicit comprises
the largest available repository of implicit social cognition data.
Id.; see also Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 122, at 979; Project Implicit website,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demolbackground/posttestinfo.html (last
visited on March 12, 2011) ("The IAT was originally developed as a device
for exploring the unconscious roots of thinking and feeling.").
206 See Schwemm, supra note 103, at 972. Author points out that in Davis,
Justice White indicated that a law's disproportionate impact "might suffice in
some cases to establish a prima facie case that would shift the burden of
proof to the government to show legitimate, nonracial considerations
prompted by its actions." Id. However, the Court concluded that showing
that Black applicants had higher failure rates was insufficient to prove dis-
criminatory purpose of Test 21. Id.; See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 198, at
2323 (arguing that lawyers' preoccupation with burden of proof is just a mis-
placed frustration over lack of tangible standard to achieve equality in dispa-
rate impact discrimination claims).
207 See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 198, at 2323. Author explores the preva-
lent "obsession" of lawyers litigating disparate impact discrimination cases
with the burden of proof. Id.
For lawyers, disputes of the theory of disparate impact are dis-
putes over the burden of proof. As an initial matter, disputes
over whether the theory is available at all reduce to the ques-
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government interests and plaintiffs have the daunting and nearly
impossible task of proving that the government acted with an
intent to discriminate. 2 8 However, the new test would eliminate
the blame-worthy state-of-mind requirement, which, as illus-
trated in this article, does not belong in equal protection juris-
prudence.20 9 Instead, the court would focus its further inquiry
on quantitative evidence documenting the disparate impact of
the law in question on the stigmatized minority.210 The objective
of this analysis would be to concentrate on the most adequate
remedial action to prevent future implicit discrimination. 211
tion of whether the plaintiff has to carry the entire burden of
proving intentional discrimination or only the lesser burden of
proving disparate impact.... Lawyers care about the burden of
proof, because in close cases, it determines who wins or loses,
with doubts resolved against the party who bears the burden.
The party who does not have the burden of proof can blame all
the gaps in the evidence and in the resulting inferences on the
party who does. Placing the burden of proof on the opposing
party often gives lawyers a decisive edge in litigation.
Id.
208 See Selmi, supra note 199, at 728; Siegel, supra note 190, at 1137-38 (dis-
cussing various ways in which the legal system enforces social stratification
and concluding that "status-enforcing state action evolves in form as it is
contested").
209 See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 198, at 2323.
210 See, e.g., Ian Ayers, Is Discrimination Elusive?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2419,
2420 (2003). Author proposes various quantitative tests to measure "unjusti-
fied disparate impacts." Id.
Race-contingent behavior should not simply be asserted. It
needs to be continually reestablished by ongoing testing and
ongoing scrutiny of test results. In many contexts, it is difficult
for individuals to know whether they are the victims or the ben-
eficiaries of discrimination because they do not know how
other types of people are treated. It is too easy for some to say
that discrimination is a thing of the past or that discrimination
is pervasive .... [Thus] [o]bjective evidence of race-contingent
decision making is knowable if we as a society have the will to
go out and look for it.
Id.
211 See Binion, supra note 103, at 446-47 (stating that many critics of the
"intent rule" recommend the courts apply a "flexible [standard of] review" to
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Specifically, if IAT data confirmed that there has been prevalent
unconscious bias based on sexual orientation, the governmental
entity would be compelled to make decisions in the future that
factor in that minority's interests and guarantee its members an
adequate representation.212
For example, if a policy in question provides retirement or
pension benefits to married and cohabitating couples registered
with the state, and the state issues marriage and domestic part-
nership licenses to validate unions between men and women,
same-sex partners will inevitably be the most affected by this
practice.213 Thus, upon showing the obvious impact of the law
on same-sex couples, the court would then look at the IAT data
to confirm that sexual minorities experience prevalent discrimi-
nation based on the traditional view of what is perceived by so-
ciety as the "family."214 Ultimately, compelling the government
to expand the definition of "family" to explicitly include same-
disproportionately disadvantaged policies by using multivariable balancing
tests effecting compromise between the legitimate interests of the state and
those of the disadvantaged group); Shawn C. Marsh, Ph.D., The Lens of Im-
plicit Bias, Juvenile and Family Justice Today (Summer 2009), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D-Research/ref/IMPLICIT% 20BIAS %2OMarsh
%20Summer%202009.pdf. The author provided several solutions to reduce
implicit bias, including, among others: education, environmental mindfulness
(for possible sources enforcing stereotypes), and debiasing, referred to as a
system of external checks and balances. Id. The debiasing assumes that im-
plicit bias will occur, and affirmative action offers a solution, which might
include "regular audits of decisions at various points, and ongoing monitoring
of data regarding relative ratios of race, gender, age, and any other groups
that experience bias." Id.
212 See, e.g., Dasgupta & Rivera, supra note 142, at 268; Kang & Lane, supra
note 15, at 474.
213 See, e.g., Fact Sheet, Lambda Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.,
Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in United States (Jan. 28, 2011), http://
www.lambdalegal.org/publications/articles/status-of-marriage-equality.html.
214 See, e.g., Dasgupta & Rivera, supra note 142, at 268 (pointing out that in
spite of public opinion polls showing public support for civil rights, IAT data
support the conclusion that "subtle forms of discrimination [against disadvan-
taged minorities] continue in many areas of everyday life"); Kang & Lane,
supra note 15, at 474-75 (compiling IAT data regarding implicit anti-gay
prejudice).
Volume 5, Number 1 Fal 11o0n
53
Kwapisz: Classification of Homosexuals Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 12+
sex partners would alleviate this type of tacit discrimination in
the future.215
Another type of law adversely impacting homosexuals would
be a statute prohibiting discrimination based on gender or sex in
government-operated educational institutions.216 Considering
the mixed litigation outcomes involving homosexuals in Title
VII cases, such a statute would mostly apply to claims of dis-
crimination perpetuating heterosexual gender stereotypes,
215 See Paul Ettenbrick, Avoiding a Collision Course in Lesbian and Gay
Family Advocacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 753, 757, 759 (2000). Author
argues that definition of family should be expanded to include LGBT, be-
cause "the current system of government and private disbursement of seem-
ingly endless family benefits and privileges to the formalized few
discriminates cruelly against the non-formalized many." Id. at 757.
Traditional marriage should be accessible on a sex-neutral ba-
sis. ... Marriage serves as a potent and strongly symbolic re-
minder of the status that certain people have as full and equal
citizens. If miscegenation laws can be struck down because they
help sustain a system of White Supremacy, then gender-exclu-
sive marriage laws should also be struck down because they
contribute to a system of patriarchal privilege and
heteronormativity.
Id. at 759; Jeffrey A. Redding, Queer/Religious Friendship in the Obama Era,
33 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 211, 253-54 (argues that the American pluralism in
state-mandated definitions of marriage, including "special" kind of covenant
marriage available to homosexuals in some states, is nothing more than an
example of "'separate but equal' family law regimes which mixed-sex and
same-sex couples enjoy within some states).
216 The hypothetical statute refers to "gender" and "sex" interchangeably to
further illustrate legislative ambiguity in drafting the provision, which is
based on a Title VII provision prohibiting gender discrimination, often re-
ferred to as the "because of sex" provision. But see Mary Anne C. Case,
Diaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: the Effeminate Man
in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 2, 9-10 (1995). Al-
though the word "gender" has come to be used synonymously with the word
"sex" in the law of discrimination, in women's studies these terms have dif-
ferent meanings. Id. at 2. "Sex" refers to the anatomical and physiological
distinctions between men and women (nouns: male/female), while "gender"
purports cultural meanings assigned to the physical distinctions (adjectives:
masculine/feminine). Id. at 9-10. See also supra note 24, and accompanying
text.
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based on the preconceived notions of femininity and masculin-
ity.217 Furthermore, depending on the reviewing court's willing-
ness to extend the application of the statute, the judiciary could
find merit in claims brought by effeminate gay men or "macho"
lesbians because these claims would still fall within the tradi-
tional notions of gender role bias.218 However, the law would
not provide any remedy in cases involving harassment by a
member of the same sex, who is uncomfortable with a person
whom he knows or suspects to be homosexual.
For example, in a case brought by a "manly" gay applicant
claiming that he was denied entry into a vocational mechanics'
program under the auspice of Department of Agriculture
(DOA) because of gender discrimination, his claim would likely
fail. Let's just add the fact that during the interview for admis-
sion into the program, the applicant inadvertently mentioned his
boyfriend, who also happened to be a mechanic. And the inter-
viewer, who is a DOA admissions counselor and a mechanic
working in an ultra-masculine setting, harbors strong convic-
tions that masculinity and homosexuality are mutually exclu-
sive.219 Based on his implicit anti-gay bias, the interviewer would
deny claimant's application simply because he was gay, even if
the candidate was not effeminate.
217 See Case, supra note 216, at 2. In cases involving discrimination claims of
individuals diverging from their gender expectations, for example, when a
woman displays masculine characteristics or a man is effeminate, discrimina-
tion against her is treated as prohibited sex discrimination. See id. However,
the man's behavior "is generally viewed as a marker for homosexual orienta-
tion and may not receive protection from [such] discrimination." Id.
218 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
219 See Ann C. McGinely, Erasing Boundaries, supra note 136 at 739-40.
The author discusses cases involving sex stereotyping brought by homosexu-
als, under Title VII. Id. Typically, such claims arise in virtually all male envi-
ronments, where co-workers or supervisors use "vulgar verbal taunts as well
as physical attacks, often to sexual organs of the victim, to harass him." Id.
Moreover, the taunts invariably include comments questioning the victim's
masculinity and his sexual orientation." Id. at 740.
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The court would start its analysis by assessing the relevant
data to determine if DOA's practices caused disparate impact to
homosexuals. Because the program is relatively new and it in-
volves a predominantly male setting, the court could find it diffi-
cult to determine that DOA engaged in gender stereotyping.
However, unlike in traditional disparate impact analysis where
the claim would likely be dismissed, here the claimant could in-
troduce pertinent IAT data as evidence of discrimination. Upon
establishing disparate impact, the court would engage in the sec-
ond part of analysis and prescribe adequate remedy, including
amendment to the statute expressly prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation. Furthermore, to achieve its for-
ward-looking objective and prevent the anti-gay discrimination
in the future, the court would require a form of affirmative ac-
tion. Consequently, DOA would be compelled to endorse gay
applicants by affirming its commitment to diversity in public
statements, school catalogs, application forms and employment
manuals. The court would also require DOA to conduct educa-
tional sessions for the employees, as well as the students, to dis-
pel anti-gay animus and promote equality. DOA could also
undertake its own anti-discriminatory initiative, for example, by
extending employee and full-time student medical benefits to
their domestic partners. Finally, the court would require DOA
to periodically report on the success of its remedial measures in
order to ensure the government's compliance.
Although the new test requires incorporating cognitive sci-
ence into the legal standards, it is obvious that we can no longer
ignore the reliability of the available statistical, quantitative data
documenting the implicit nature of bias.220 Integrating the
wealth of information contained in the existing and ever-ex-
220 See Kang, Pushback from the Left, supra note 176, at 1140 (explaining
that modern evidence of implicit social cognition should be incorporated into
preventive policies and doctrinal interpretations of the laws); see also Green-
wald & Krieger, supra note 15, at 966-67 (discussing utility of cognitive sci-
ence's "evolving, accumulating body of reproducible research findings" in the
context of disparate impact analysis).
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panding data bank of IAT would provide for a meaningful anal-
ysis, adequately addressing Equal Protection Clause principles
for sexual minorities.221
V. CONCLUSION
Sexual minorities have suffered long and comprehensive dis-
crimination222 and should gain protective status under the Equal
Protection Clause.223 However, neither suspect nor quasi-sus-
pect classification will provide LGBTs with adequate protection
from facially-neutral laws.224 In our modern, seemingly egalita-
rian society, where laws with a clear discriminatory impact re-
main abundant,225 cognitive science reconciles this discrepancy
with its extensive body of work on implicit bias.226 Furthermore,
221 Schwemm, supra note 103, at 1002 ("The deficiency in the analysis sug-
gested by Davis is that it accords undue deference to the government's justifi-
cations for actions that in fact discriminate against minorities.").
222 See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 6; ESKRIDGE, SEXUALITY, supra
note 6.
223 See HART ELY, supra note 73, at 162. The author argues that homosexu-
als should be granted suspect classification, because "[h]omosexuals for years
have been the victims of both 'first-grade prejudice' and subtler forms of ex-
aggerated we-they stereotyping." Id.; KARST, supra note 2, at 210.
224 See, e.g., KARST, supra note 2, at 210 (pointing out that "harms from di-
rect, intentional stigmatizing acts" against a minority group are easier to
prove, unlike "harms inflicted indirectly," which require proof of intent);
Lawrence, supra note 13, at 324-35 ("By insisting that a blameworthy perpe-
trator be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowl-
edged, the Court creates an imaginary world where the discrimination does
not exist unless it was consciously intended."); Russell K. Robinson, Percep-
tual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1100 (2008) (pointing out that
segregation extends to our minds, because "Black and white people tend to
perceive allegations of racial discrimination through fundamentally different
cognitive frameworks").
225 See supra note 7.
226 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 1000. The authors argue that
while "judges develop and elaborate substantive legal theories, they should
guard against basing their analysis on inaccurate conceptions of relevant, real
world phenomena." Id. Instead, "epistemic theories, both descriptive and
normative, should be periodically revisited and revised to incorporate the
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Congress' omission of a discriminatory intent requirement in Ti-
tle VII further supports the conclusion that the second prong of
the Davis disparate impact test is inadequate to prove discrimi-
nation. Thus, to remedy the defective, unfair laws adversely af-
fecting sexual minorities, the courts must recognize the implicit
nature of prejudice and incorporate the new understanding and
empirical data into its analysis. 227 Proclaiming equality does not
affect equality.228 Hence, it is time for the law to grant sexual
minorities equal citizenship rights as clearly contemplated by
the Equal Protection Clause, because "what happens to homo-
sexuals, ultimately affects all of American society." 229
evolving understanding, derived from the empirical sciences, of how human
cognitive processes actually work." Id.; see also Greenwald & Krieger, supra
note 15, at 952; Kang & Lane, supra note 15, at 520.
227 See Krieger & Friske, supra note 176, at 1000; Kang & Lane, supra note
15, at 520; Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 123, at 1493 (discussing
the implicit bias studies, of which results are "stunning, reproducible, and
valid by traditional scientific metrics").
228 Cf Note, Constitutional Status, supra note 69, at 1309. The author argues
that constitutional protection [barring discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation] under "the right of privacy and the first amendment are neither broad
enough in the conceptions of sexual orientations nor wide-ranging.., in their
remedies to offer an adequate legal response to the problem of gay inequal-
ity." Id. However, "[a]n equal protection approach to gay rights recognizes
both that personhood is the value to be protected and that pervasive inequal-
ity is the evil to overcome." Id.
229 See KARST, supra note 2, at 210. The author argues that the Supreme
Court needs to recognize constitutionally guaranteed equal rights of homo-
sexuals and refuse to justify the government's policies of exclusion. Id.
One day ... the laws that stigmatize gays and lesbians will fol-
low Jim Crow into a deserved oblivion ..... In the meanwhile,
however, gay and lesbian Americans - a group of many mil-
lions who experience their hurt one at a time - will live every
day with the pains that come from being officially branded as
outsiders.
Id.
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